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I. INTRODUCTION
The last three years have brought the public to a state of
awareness, often bordering on hysteria, concerning child sexual
abuse. As the media uncovers new scandals throughout the coun-
try,' increasing numbers of concerned citizens look to prosecutors
and legislatures to take action. Prosecutors have replied by filing
more charges, and legislatures have in turn considered, and in
many cases adopted, new statutory definitions of child sexual
abuse. Critical for our purposes, legislatures' have also considered,
1. See State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836 (1985). In Myatt, the court said:
[TIhe incidence of sexual abuse of young children has increased dramatically in
recent years.... Statistics show that there has been a 200% increase in the
reporting of sexual abuse since 1976. By 1980, there were 25,000 reported cases
annually. A substantial number of cases are never reported; estimates of the ac-
tual incidence vary from 100,000 to 500,000 per year.
Id. at. 697 P.2d at 841.
2. Other groups have been active as well. For example, the Attorney General's Task
Force on Family Violence issued its final report in September of 1984. Further, in July of
1985, the American Bar Association (ABA) approved the report of the Prosecution Function
Committee of the Criminal Justice Section entitled Guidelines for the Fair Treatment of
Child Witnesses in Cases Where Child Abuse is Alleged. The ABA recommends the follow-
ing procedural reforms:
In criminal cases and juvenile delinquency and child protection proceedings where child
abuse is alleged, court procedures and protocol should be modified as necessary to accom-
modate the needs of child witnesses including.
a) If the competency of a child is in question, the court should evaluate compe-
tency on an individual basis without resort to mandatory or arbitrary age
limitations.
b) Leading questions may be utilized on direct and cross-examination of a child
witness subject to the court's discretion and control
c) To avoid intimidation or confusion of a child witness, examination and cross-
examination should be carefully monitored by the presiding judge.
d) When necessary, the child should be permitted to testify from a location
other than that normally reserved for witnesses who testify in the particular
courtroom.
e) A person supportive of the child witness should be permitted to be present
and accessible to the child at all times during his or her testimony, but without
influencing the child's testimony.
f) The child should be permitted to use anatomically correct dolls and drawings
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and in many cases adopted, new evidentiary rules designed to facil-
itate pro3ecution of child sexual abuse cases and to reduce the
trauma or emotional distress experienced by victims of child sexual
abuse as a result of the litigation process itself.
State legislatures have dealt with reform of the rules of evi-
dence in two basic ways. First, legislatures have created a hearsay
exception for child sexual abuse prosecutions that makes out of
court statements of the victim admissible under certain prescribed
circumstances. Second, legislatures have authorized the prosecu-
tion to permit the parties to play videotaped recordings of state-
ments, depositions, or preliminary hearing testimony of the child
victim at trial instead of eliciting viva voce testimony. They also
have authorized the child witness to testify at trial over closed cir-
cuit television or in a specially designed children's courtroom. The
purpose of such reforms is to allow the child to testify without hav-
ing to come face to face with the accused in open court. Both types
of reforms have many variations.
The purpose of this article is to explore the constitutionality
of these reforms under the confrontation clause.$ In the process,
the wisdom of the particular reform will be commented on and,
where appropriate, suggested modifications set forth.
II. CHILDREN'S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS
A. Hypothetical Case
A mother leaves her four year old daughter, Alice, in the cus-
tody of the mother's live-in boyfriend, Sam. Eight hours after be-
ing returned to her mother's care, the mother asks her little girl
how she enjoyed her time with Sam. In her reply, Alice tells her
during his or her testimony or any other manner.
g) When necessary, the child should be permitted to testify via closed-circuit
television or through a one-way mirror so long as the defendant's right to con-
frontation is not impaired.
h) Persons not necessary to the proceedings should be excluded from the court-
room at the request of a child witness or his or her representative during pretrial
hearings in cases where the child is alleged to be the victim of physical, emo-
tional, or sexual abuse.
i) At pretrial hearings and in child protection proceedings the court, in its dis-
cretion, if necessary to avoid the repeated appearance of a child witness, may
allow the use of reliable hearsay.
j) When necessary, the court should permit the child's testimony at a pretrial or
noncriminal hearing to be given by means of a videotaped deposition.
See Report of the Prosecution Function Committee of the Criminal Justice Section, Guide-
lines for the Fair Treatment of Child Witnesses in Cases Where Child Abuse is Alleged.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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mother that the boyfriend touched her, pointing to her genital
area. After calling the police, Alice's mother takes her to the emer-
gency room for an examination. A police officer interviews the
child later in the day at her home. Alice tells both the doctor and
the police officer that "Sam rubbed his hand up and down on me
right here," pointing to her genitals.
In order for Alice's out of court statements to be admissible in
a criminal prosecution of Sam, the statements, being hearsay, must
meet the requirements of a hearsay exception and must satisfy the
requirements of the confrontation clause. The question of whether
Alice's out of court statements are admissible may well be critical
to successful prosecution of Sam.'
B. Hearsay Exceptions
1. COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
At common law, and under rules of evidence modeled on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, several traditional hearsay exceptions
should be considered to determine whether they permit introduc-
tion of one or more of Alice's statements. Barriers to admissibility
exist, however, with respect to each of the potential avenues of ad-
missibility, that most likely cannot be overcome.
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) provides a hearsay exception
for a present sense impression. The rule defines a present sense
impression as "a statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition, or immediately thereafter."' Obviously, this does not
apply to Alice's statement made no earlier than eight hours after
4. See State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836 (1985):
Often the child victim's out-of-court statements constitute the only proof of the
crime of sexual abuse. Witnesses other than the victim and perpetrator are rare
as people simply do not molest children in front of others .... Most often the
offender is a relative or close acquaintance who has the opportunity to be alone
with the child .... Depending on the type of sexual contact, corroborating
physical evidence may be absent or inconclusive ... The child may be unable
to testify at trial due to fading memory, retraction of earlier statements due to
guilt or fear, tender age, or inability to appreciate the proceedings in which he or
she is a participant. Therefore, these hearsay statements are usually necessary to
the proceedings as the only probative evidence available.
Id. at.. 697 P.2d at 841; see also Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions for a Child's State-
ment of Sexual Abuses, 18 J. MAR 1, 5-6 (1984); Note, A Comprehensive Approach to
Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUm. L. Rev. 1745 (1983); Note, The
Sexually Abused Infant Hearsay Exceptions: A Constitutional Analysis, 8 J. Juv. L 59
(1984).
5. FRD. R. EVID. 803(1).
.[Vol. 40:19
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the event.
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides a hearsay exception
for excited utterances. The rule defines an excited utterance as "a
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event
or condition." This rule offers a greater possibility for admissibil-
ity even though Alice made her initial statement several hours af-
ter the event. The requirements for admissibility under this excep-
tion are: (1) the occurrence of an event or condition sufficiently
startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2)
a statement made while under the influence of the startling event
or condition; and (3) a statement relating to the startling event or
condition. Accordingly, lapse of time between the startling event
and the out of court statement, although relevant, is not disposi-
tive. Nor is it dispositive that Alice made her statement in re-
sponse to her mother's inquiry. Rather, these are factors which the
trial court must weigh in determining whether the offered testi-
mony falls within the excited utterance exception. Other factors
the court should consider include the age of the declarant, the
physical, mental, and most importantly emotional condition of the
declarant during the relevant time period, the characteristics of
the event and the subject matter of the statement. In order to ap-
ply the excited utterance exception, the court must find that the
statement was spontaneous and impulsive rather than the product
of reflection and deliberation. Although courts have been liberal in
child sexual abuse cases when deciding whether the requirements
of this exception have been satisfied,' it is doubtful that Alice's
6. Id. at 803(2).
7. See State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836 (1985). In Myatt, the court stated
that-
In those cases where the child was unavailable or unable to qualify as a witness,
the res gestae and necessity exceptions of K.S.A. 60-460(d) were available.
Under 60-460(d), statements made at the same time, or close in time with the
events perceived, but prior to the commencement of any legal action, were ad-
missible whether or not the child testified at trial. ...The underlying rationale
of the res gestae exception is that any statement arising during this period is
assumed to be free of conscious fabrication and is considered trustworthy for
that reason. The exclusive use of this exception in child abuse cases is not ade-
quate because if fails to take into account the childhood perspective on sexual
experiences which may not include the immediate, emotional shock an adult
would feel. 'The major weakness of the exception in this context stems from its
undue reliance on spontaneity as an indicator of trustworthiness, to the exclu-
sion of other equally valid indicia of reliability.' . . .Often, a significant delay
precedes the child's statement, thereby violating the time requirement of 60-
460(d). This delay may be caused by the victim's fear of not being believed,
1985]
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statements would be admitted. Alice made the comment calmly
in response to her mother's question eight hours after the event.
It is difficult to characterize her statement as spontaneous and
impulsive.
The statement Alice made to the doctor in the emergency
room must be evaluated in light of the medical diagnosis or treat-
ment exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4). This rule pro-
vides for admissibility of "statements made for purposes of medi-
cal diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past
or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or gen-
eral character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as rea-
sonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."' There are two bar-
riers to admissibility in Alice's case. First, the identity of the
person who allegedly rubbed Alice's genital area is not pertinent to
medical diagnosis or treatment,' unless treatment includes the pos-
sibility of removing Alice from the threat of future sexual abuse by
Sam, or includes obtaining information in contemplation of future
feelings of confusion or guilt, efforts to forget, and threats against the child by
the defendant. ...Consequently, a child often keeps silent until he or she is
somehow compelled to relate what has happened.
A very young child (sexually abused] by an adult standing in the position of
parent, caretaker or friend cannot be expected to immediately come forward
with a complete and exact report of the event. The courts have recognized that
the child may be unable to speak about the incident until she considers herself
safely in the presence of a compassionate adult whom she can trust. Because the
child has no clear understanding of what has been done to her, her original com-
plaint often consists of responses to the questioning of a patient, persistent adult
who draws the child's story from her.
Some courts, recognizing the flaws in a mechanical application of the res
gestae exception to child-victim hearsay statements, have attempted to apply
the exception beyond its established limits by allowing into evidence statements
made hours, or even days, after the event.
Courts have thus tended to stretch existing hearsay exceptions to accommo-
date a child victim's out-of-court statements because they are deemed uniquely
necessary and trustworthy. The problem with "stretching" the existing excep-
tions in this manner is the destruction of the certainty and integrity of the ex-
ceptions. For these reasons, the Kansas legislature enacted the new hearsay ex-
ception. Although many statements admissible under the new exception may fall
within an older exception, 60-460(dd) is broader. The statute is intended to al-
low the courts to be sensitive to the critical need for a child victim's out-of-court
statements, while allowing them to address the various reliability problems
posed by the statements, thus protecting the defendant's confrontation rights.
Id. at _, 697 P.2d at 842.
The term res gestae is not employed under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
8. Fan. R. EvID. 803(4).
9. The identity of the alleged perpetrator may be relevant to medical diagnosis or treat-
ment if an examination of the perpetrator will assist in the determination of the presence or
absence of venereal disease.
[Vol. 40:19
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psychological counseling of Alice. 10 Second, the reliability of hear-
say statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment rests on the assumption that the declarant is aware of the
importance of telling the truth to a doctor in order to secure
proper medical care. It is questionable whether Alice, at the age of
four, was so aware.
Alice's statement to the police officer does not meet the re-
quirements of any traditional hearsay exception whether as con-
tained in his report or as testified to at trial. Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(8), Which provides a hearsay exception for "records,
reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public
offices or agencies . . ."" does not apply to the police officer's re-
port for two reasons. First, it involves a matter observed by a po-
lice officer offered against a criminal defendant, which is expressly
excluded under Rule 803(8)(B)."' Second, there is no second level
hearsay exception applicable to Alice's statement itself. The latter
observation also precludes the police officer from testifying to Al-
10. See, e.g., People v. Wilkins, 134 Mich. App. 39, 349 N.W.2d 815 (1984). In Wilkens
the court stated:
Dr. Scheurer testified that the role of her clinic is to assess difficult parent-child
problems. In a sexual abuse case, the clinic diagnoses and treats the medical,
physical, developmental and psychological components of a sexual abuse case.
There is no way in which the clinic could adequately diagnose and treat the
impact of sexual abuse on a child unless it was known that the source of abuse
was a family member. Part of the treatment that was recommended for the vic-
tim was that she begin seeing a child psychologist and that she be removed,
through the probate court, from her home. This treatment would have been im-
possible had the clinic not known the source of the sexual abuse was the victim's
stepfather. Consequently, the statements elicited from her were reasonably nec-
essary to her diagnosis and treatment. We therefore hold that the trial court
correctly admitted the testimony of Dr. Scheurer under MRS 803(4).
Id. at 45, 349 N.W.2d at 817-18. See also Goldade v. Wyoming, 674 P.2d 721, 726 (Wyo.
1983) ("It is apparent from the testimony of the physician that he was involved in attempt-
ing to diagnose and, if diagnosed, to then treat child abuse, not simply bruises on the little
girl's face. The identity of the person causing those injuries is a pertinent fact in these
circumstances.").
It is suggested that concern over the successful prosecution of child sex abuse should
not be permitted to distort the hearsay exception of statements for medical diagnosis or
treatment. FP&. R. Evm. 803(4). The possibility of distortion exists because almost anything
is relevant to the diagnosis or treatment of psychological well being. Similarly, far too many
untrustworthy statements are relevant to prevention of repetition. The application of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 803(4) should remain restricted to statements pertinent to "physical"
medical diagnosis or treatment. Other statements argued to possess adequate indicia of
trustworthiness should be judged against the hearsay exceptions of Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 803(24) and 804(b)(5), and most importantly, specific hearsay exceptions applicable
solely in prosecutions for child sexual abuse.
11. FED. R. EviD. 803(8).
12. Id. at 803(8)(B).
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ice's statement at trial.
Alice's statement to the police officer, and to the same or
greater extent, her two prior out of court statements, possess the
indicia of reliability of being (1) a statement describing an embar-
rassing fact which a child would not normally convey unless true,
and (2) a cry for help."3 There is, however, no traditional common
law hearsay exception applicable to statements constituting a cry
for help that discloses an embarrassing event. The closest analogy
in the common law is the notion of a prompt complaint in a rape
or sexual abuse case where the statements are admissible to cor-
roborate the in court testimony of the complainant. Traditionally,
prompt complaint evidence is limited to the fact of the complaint,
thereby excluding any reference to either the name of the offender
or the details of the offense.
Alice's statements possess additional indicia of reliability be-
cause they describe an event that a four year old is not likely to
realize could occur between an adult male and a young girl. In ad-
dition, she used language that one would expect a four year old girl
to use. While not as reliable as, "He put his wee wee in my mouth.
It got real big and exploded," where the physical possibility of the
act is unlikely to be known unless experienced, Alice's statement
describing Sam rubbing her genitals is not something a young girl
is likely to know a grown man may enjoy doing. There is, of course,
no traditional hearsay exception for statements of a young child
that describe an event that the child is not likely to know is possi-
ble or sexually gratifying to some men.
In the hypothetical case of Alice, it is thus extremely likely
that none of Alice's three out of court statements, made between
eight and twenty-four hours after the alleged sexual abuse, will fall
within a traditional hearsay exception. In the federal courts and a
number of state courts, however, the traditional hearsay exceptions
do not exclusively control admissibility; an out of court statement
may be admissible under the "other" hearsay exceptions of Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(24) or 804(b)(5). These two rules, which are
identical with the exception that Rule 804(b)(5) requires that the
13. For a discussion about the possibility that a parent or other adult has suggested the
existance of the act to the child and the child either now believes the event occurred or is
merely repeating the conveyed story to please the adult, see infra notes 79, 86 and accompa-
nying text.
Alleged incidents of false accusations of child sexual abuse has led to the formation of a
group called Victims of Child Abuse Laws (VOCAL). This group claims to have members in
48 states. For a discussion of VOCAL, see Miami Herald, July 28, 1985 (Tropic Magazine),
at 23.
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declarant be unavailable at trial, provide as follows:
A statement not specifically covered iby any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness [is not barred by the rule against hearsay], if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of
a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the propo-
nent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a
statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer
the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.'
Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) each contain five express require-
ments which must be satisfied before the statement can be admit-
ted.
1. Equivalent Trustworthiness. The most significant re-
quirement is that the statement must possess "circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" equivalent to that of statements ad-
mitted under one of the traditional hearsay exceptions (the first
twenty-three exceptions contained in Rule 803 and the first four
exceptions contained in Rule 804(b)). In order to evaluate the
trustworthiness of a prior statement, the courts look to several cri-
teria: (1) certainty that the statement was made, which should in-
clude, where appropriate, an assessment of the credibility of the
person testifying in court to the existence of the statement; (2) as-
surance of the declarant's personal knowledge of the underlying
event or condition; (3) whether the statement was made under
oath; (4) the practical availability of the declarant at trial for
meaningful cross-examination concerning the underlying event or
condition [obviously inapplicable to Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(5)]; and finally, (5) an ad hoc ascertainment of trustworthi-
ness based upon the totality of the surrounding circumstances.
Relevant factors which bear upon such ascertainment of trustwor-
thiness include: (1) the declarant's partiality (interest, bias, cor-
ruption, or coercion); (2) the presence or absence of time to fabri-
cate; (3) suggestiveness brought on by the use of leading questions;
14. FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
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and (4) whether the declarant has ever reaffirmed or recanted the
statement.5 In child sexual abuse cases, the court should also con-
sider whether the child's statement: (1) discloses an embarassing
event; (2) is a cry for help; (3) employs appropriate child-like lan-
guage; or (4) describes an act of sexual contact that the child is not
likely to realize is either possible or sexually gratifying to an adult
unless actually experienced by the child. The age and maturity of
the child, the nature and duration of the sexual contact, the physi-
cal and mental condition of the child when the statement was
made, and the relationship of the child and the accused are also
appropriately considered. On the other hand, the court should also
consider whether the statment may have resulted from suggestive-
ness or command by an adult close to the child."
2. Necessity. Introduction of the hearsay statement must be
necessary; it must be more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent may reasona-
bly procure. Whether the court can reasonably demand a particu-
lar effort to obtain alternative proof of a matter depends upon the
fact at issue, considered in light of its posture in the total litiga-
tion. If the child testifies fully at trial about the relevant events,
the "necessity" for the introduction of his or her out of court state-
ment may be brought into question. If this occurs, circumstances
surrounding the out of court statement, such as being made
15. See also MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDRNCE § 324.1, at 908-09 (3d ed. 1984):
[Als the volume of decided cases increases, certain recurring factors are acquir-
ing recognition as significant in deciding whether to apply the residual excep-
tion. Among them are: whether the statement was under oath, the duration of
the time lapse between event and statement, motivation to speak truthfully or
otherwise, and whether declarant had firsthand knowledge. These are factors
that bear upon the declarant at the time of making the statement, as is charac-
teristic of the specific hearsay exceptions generally, and fairly fall within the
description 'equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.' In addi-
tion, the courts have recognized further factors which did not bear upon declar-
ant at the time he was speaking but which, viewed in retrospect, tend to support
the truthfulness of his statement. These include: corroboration, whether the de-
clarant has recanted or reaffirmed the statement, and whether the declarant is
now subject to cross-examination. Strictly speaking, these may not be
'equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness' in the language of the
residual exception, but it would be unrealistic to ignore their bearing on the
question of the truthfulness of the hearsay statement. Each situation still de-
pends largely upon its own particular circumstances, and the force of precedent
is developing rather slowly. The present status may well be a replay of the early
stages of the evolution of the currently accepted specific exceptions.
Id.
16. See infra note 79.
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promptly when the declarant's recollection was fresh, being made
without solicitation, being a cry for help, and being influenced by
the preparation of litigation, etc., would foster admissibility.
3. Material Fact. The requirement that the statement be
offered as evidence of a material fact probably means that not only
must the fact the statement is offered to prove relevant, 7 the fact
must be of substantial importance in determining the outcome of
the litigation.
4. Satisfaction of Purposes of Rules. The requirement that
admission of the statement into evidence must serve the interest of
justice and the general purposes of the rules of evidence has little
practical importance in determining admissibility.
5. Notice. Courts generally enforce the requirement of no-
tice in advance of trial, but it may be dispensed with if there is no
apparent prejudice to the opponent, and the need for the hearsay
statement arises on the eve of the trial or during the course of the
trial. To avoid prejudice, the court may grant a continuance to the
opponent so that he can prepare to meet or contest the introduc-
tion of the hearsay statement.
2. SPECIAL STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS
Several states have enacted hearsay exceptions applicable
solely in prosecutions for child sexual abuse.1 8 These statutes are
designed to permit admissibility of out of court statements of child
victims when the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness demanded by Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) (sometimes re-
ferred to as indicia of reliability). Accordingly, under these statu-
tory hearsay exceptions, courts do not base admissibility upon a
categorical assessment of trustworthiness like that which accompa-
nies each of the traditional hearsay exceptions enumerated in Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 803(1)-(23) and 804(b)(1)-(4). Rather, these
state statutes require a particularized showing that the child's
statement describing prohibited sexual contact possesses equiv-
alent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to that pos-
sessed by hearsay statements admissible under Rules 803(1)-(23)
and 804(b)(1)-(4). For example, in accordance with a recommenda-
tion of the National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and
17. FED. R. EvID. 401.
18. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.460(dd) (1983);
WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1974).
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Protection, Washington enacted the following statute:'9
A statement made by a child when under the age of ten
describing any act of sexual contact performed with or on the
child by another, not otherwise admissible by statute or court
rule, is admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings in the
courts of the state of Washington if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence
of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the
statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: Provided, that when the
child is unavailable as a witness, such statement may
be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of
the act.
Kansas enacted a hearsay exception applicable only to unavailable
child declarants based upon a particularized finding of indicia of
trustworthiness.2 0 The statute applies not only in criminal proceed-
ings but elsewhere as well. It provides:
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness
while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth of the
matter stated is hearsay and inadmissible except:
(dd) In a criminal proceeding or in a proceeding to deter-
mine if a child is a deprived child under the Kansas juvenile
code or a child in need of care under the Kansas code for care of
children, a statement made by a child, to prove the crime or that
the child is a deprived child or a child in need of care, if:
(1) the child is alleged to be a victim of the crime, a de-
prived child or a child in need of care; and
(2) the trial court finds after a hearing on the matter that
the child is disqualified or unavailable as a witness, the state-
ment is apparently reliable and the child was not induced to
make the statement falsely by use of threats or promises.
If a statement is admitted pursuant to this subsection in a
trial to a jury, the trial judge shall instruct the jury that it is for
the jury to determine the weight and credit to be given the
statement and that, in making the determination, it shall con-
sider the age and maturity of the child, the nature of the state-
ment, the circumstances under which the statement was made,
19. WASH. Rzv. CODE § 9A44:120 (1974).
20. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.460 (dd)(1983).
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any possible threats or promises that might have been made to
the child to obtain the statement and any other relevant factor.
Kansas also enacted a hearsay exception, applicable in civil and
criminal proceedings, that permits a party to introduce, subject to
satisfaction of specified requirements indicative of trustworthiness,
statements of an unavailable declarant that relate to a recently
perceived event or condition. Section 60-460(d)(3) of the Kansas
statutes permits admission of the following statements:
A statement. (1) which the judge finds was made while the de-
clarant was perceiving the event or condition which the state-
ment narrates, describes or explains, or (2) which the judge finds
was made while the declarant was under the stress of nervous
excitement caused by such perception, or (3) if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness, a statement narrating, describing or ex-
plaining an event or condition which the judge finds was made
by the declarant at a time when the matter had been recently
perceived by the declarant and while his or her recollection was
clear, and was made in good faith prior to the commencement of
the action and with no incentive to falsify or to distort.
In 1985, the Florida legislature joined the parade. Section
90.803(23) of the Florida statutes provides as follows:
SECTION 90.803 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; AVAILABILITY OF
DECLARANT IMMATERIAL
The provision of § 90.802 to the contrary notwithstanding,
the following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(23) Statement of Child Victim of Sexual Abuse or Sexual
Offense Against A Child.-
(a) Unless the source of information or the method or cir-
cumstances by which the statement is reported indicates a lack
of trustworthiness, an out-of-court statement made by a child
victim with a physical, mental, emotional, or developmental age
of 11 or less describing any act of child abuse, sexual abuse, or
any other offense involving an unlawful sexual act, contact, in-
trusion, or penetration performed in the presence of, with, by, or
on the declarant child, not otherwise admissible, is admissible in
evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding if:
1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the pres-
ence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the
statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. In making
its determination, the court may consider the mental and physi-
cal age and maturity of the child, the nature and duration of the
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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
abuse or offense, the relationship of the child to the offender,
the reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the child victim,
and any other factor deemed appropriate; and
2. The child either:
a. Testifies; or
b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is other
corroborative evidence of the abuse or offense. Unavailability
shall include a finding by the court that the child's participation
in the trial or proceeding would result in a substantial likelihood
of severe emotional or mental harm in addition to findings pur-
suant to § 90.804(1)."
(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no
later than 10 days before trial that a statement which qualifies
as a hearsay exception pursuant to this section will be offered as
evidence at trial. The notice shall include a written statement of
the content .of the child's statement, the time at which the state-
ment was made, the circumstances surrounding the statement
which indicate its reliability, and such other particulars as nec-
essary to provide full disclosure of the statement.
(c) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the rec-
ord, as to the basis for its ruling under this section.2
21. FLA. STAT. § 90.804(1) (1983) provides as follows:
Definition of Unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness means that the
declarant
(a) Is exempted by a ruling of a court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement;
(b) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his
statement despite an order of the court to do so;
(c) Has suffered a lack of memory of the subject matter of his state-
ment so as to destroy his effectiveness as a witness during the trial;
(d) Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of
death or because of then existing physical or mental illness or infir-
mity; or
(e) Is absent from the hearing, and the proponent of his statement
has been unable to procure his attendance or testimony by process or
other reasonable means.
However, a declarant is not unavailable as a witness if such exemp-
tion, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability to be present, or ab-
sence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the party who is
the proponent of his statement in preventing the witness from at-
tending or testifying.
Id.
For a discussion of the competency of a child as a witness, see infra text accompanying
notes 130-33, and for a discussion of unavailability, see infra Section III B(I). With respect
to a Florida statute that imposes a less stringent standard of unavailibility in connection
with the use of closed circuit television or a videotaped deposition of a child witness, see
infra note 137.
22. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (Supp. 1985).
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C. Confrontation Clause
Even if Alice's out of court statements satisfy a hearsay excep-
tion, they can not be admitted into evidence in a criminal prosecu-
tion against Sam unless they satisfy the confrontation clause as
well. The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment provides
that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
...to be confronted with the witnesses against him."'3 The defen-
dant's right to confront witnesses is not absolute. If it were abso-
lute, it would preclude admission of all out of court statements
made by an unavailable witness, even if the statements met the
requirements of one of the hearsay exceptions (with the possible
exception of former testimony). In order to analyze the relation-
ship between the rules against hearsay and its exceptions and the
confrontation clause, it is necessary to distinguish out of court
statements of witnesses who give viva voce testimony in court from
out of court statements of witnesses who do not testify at the trial
of the accused. We may, for the sake of convenience, call the for-
mer group of witnesses "testifying witnesses" and the latter group
"available but not appearing" and "unavailable" witnesses.
1. TESTIFYING WITNESSES
In our hypothetical, assume the court finds Alice competent to
testify at trial. When Alice takes the witness stand at trial, she can
testify either inconsistently or consistently with her prior out of
court statements, claim not to recall the event or condition in
question, assert a privilege, or be unable or unwilling to give testi-
mony. If she claims not to recall, asserts a privilege, or is unable or
unwilling to testify, she is in fact unavailable as a witness.'4
(a). Prior Inconsistent Statement. If Alice testifies inconsis-
tently with her prior out of court statements, the prosecution may
seek to introduce her prior statements both as substantive evi-
dence and to impeach. If the prosecution offers the out of court
statements for their truth, each statement must meet a hearsay ex-
ception. If the particular statement does not meet either a tradi-
tional hearsay exception' or an available hearsay exception for
other reliable hearsay,2' the statement may still be admissible if it
23. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
24. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
25. Id. at 803(1)-(23), 804(b)(1)(4).
26. Id. at 803(24), 804(b)(5).
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meets the hearsay exemption" or exception now provided in some
jurisdictions for prior inconsistent statements. Alice's statements,
however, would not meet the hearsay exemption for prior inconsis-
tent statements contained in Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The rule states that a statement is defined as
"not hearsay," and thus not barred by the rule against hearsay,
when the "declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement
is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other pro-
ceeding, or in a deposition."' 8 Since Alice did not make the out of
court statements under the prescribed circumstances, Rule
801(d)(1)(A) does not provide an avenue for her prior inconsistent
statements' substantive introduction at trial. California, on the
other hand, in section 1235 of the Evidence Code, provides for the
substantive admissibility of all prior inconsistent statements of tes-
tifying declarants provided the witness has an opportunity at trial
to admit, deny, or explain the statements."
In California v. Green,0 decided in 1970, the Supreme Court
of the United States considered the application of the confronta-
tion clause to the admissibility of prior inconsistant statements
proferred as substantive evidence under Section 1235 of the Cali-
fornia Evidence Code. In this case, John Green was convicted of
supplying marijuana to Melvin Porter, a minor. At a preliminary
hearing and in an oral, unsworn statement to a police officer,
Porter identified Green as his supplier. At trial, however, Porter
was evasive and uncooperative. He claimed that he could not recall
who supplied the marijuana to him because he was under the influ-
ence of LSD at the time of the transaction. The trial court admit-
ted both prior statements under Section 1235 of the California
Evidence Code. The California Supreme Court reversed the defen-
dant's conviction on the ground that admission of the prior state-
ment as substantive evidence violated his right of confrontation.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, upholding the consti-
tutional validity of Section 1235.
In its analysis, the United States Supreme Court identified
three purposes of confrontation: (1) to ensure that the witness
27. The reasons for creating an exemption rather than an exception are discussed in
FED. R. EvID. 801(d) advisory committee note.
28. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
29. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1965).
30. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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gives his or her statement under oath; (2) to provide an opportu-
nity for cross-examination; and (3) to allow the jury to assess the
demeanor of the witness making the statement. Conceding that a
prior out of court statement might be made under circumstances
having none of these protections, the Supreme Court nevertheless
found that each of the purposes of confrontation would be satisfied
when the declarant testified at trial:
[A]s far as the oath is concerned, the witness must now affirm,
deny, or qualify the truth of the prior statement under the pen-
alty of perjury ....
Second, the inability to cross-examine the witness at the
time he made his prior statement cannot easily be shown to be
of crucial significance as long as the defendant is assured of full
and effective cross-examination at the time of trial.
.. . The witness who now relates a different story about the
events in question must necessarily assume a position as to the
truth value of his prior statement, thus giving the jury a chance
to observe and evaluate his demeanor as he either disavows or
qualifies his earlier statement.8 1
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that prior inconsistent
statements which satisfy the requirements of Section 1235 do not
run afoul of the confrontation clause. For a prior inconsistent
statement to be admitted under this rule, the declarant must tes-
tify before the jury, under oath, and be subject to cross-examina-
tion and redirect examination before the jury regarding the state-
ment; the jury can evaluate such responses.82
In Green, the Supreme Court specifically declined to decide
the question of the admissibility of the prior statement to the po-
lice officer, because, at trial, Porter did not affirm, deny, or qualify
the truth of the prior statement, but instead testified to a lack of
recollection of the underlying event. This raised the issue of
whether the defendant was "assured of full and effective cross-ex-
amination at the time of trial." The Supreme Court explained:
Whether Porter's apparent lapse of memory so affected Green's
right to cross-examine [at trial] as to make a critical difference
31. Id. at 158-60.
32. In Green, 399 U.S. at 149, the witness admitted making the prior inconsistant state-
ment. In Nelson v. O'Neil, the Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause is satisfied
with respect to a prior inconsistent statement if the witness has recollection, and is subject
to cross-examination. 402 U.S. 622 (1971). This is true even if the witness denies making the
prior statement.
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in the application of the Confrontation Clause in this case is an
issue which is not ripe for decision at this juncture. The state
court did not focus on this precise question. . . . Nor has either
party addressed itself to the question. Its resolution depends
much upon the unique facts in this record, and we are reluctant
to proceed without the state court's views of what the record
actually discloses relevant to this particular issue."5
(b). Prior Consistent Statement. According to Green, if Al-
ice's testimony at trial is consistent with her prior out of court
statements, and she is available for cross-examination, the court
may admit her prior consistent statements without violating the
confrontation clause. Even though Alice's prior consistent state-
ments do not violate the confrontation clause they may not be ad-
missible for evidentiary reasons. At common law, and under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, prior consistent statements are admis-
sible only when offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive. The express or implied charge will usually arise during
cross-examination. It can also surface initially during the presenta-
tion of the opponent's case in chief. In either event, this limited
window of admissibility makes introduction of Alice's prior consis-
tent statements at trial somewhat problematic.
The common law doctrine of prompt complaint" affords Al-
ice's prior consistent statements a possible avenue of admissibility
that is not available under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
prompt complaint doctrine provides that when a witness testifies
at trial accusing someone of a sexual offense, the fact that the
witness promptly complained of the occurrence, absent details
describing the incident, including the name of the offender, is ad-
missible when testified to by the declarant or someone who heard
the statement. The statement of prompt complaint is admitted to
corroborate the in court testimony of the complainant. It is admis-
sible under the theory that the evidence of prompt complaint re-
33. 399 U.S. at 168-70. For a discussion of the quesion that was reserved in Green, see
M. GRAHAM, WITNESS INTIMIDATION: THE LAW'S RESPONSE 143-49 (1985).
34. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(B). Assessment of the probative value of prior consistent
statements, made in light of various trial concerns, such as misleading the jury and waste of
time, is the reason for the limited avenue of admissibility.
At common law prior consistent statements are admissible solely to corroborate; under
the Federal Rules of Evidence prior inconsistent statements are admissible as substantive
evidence.
35. See generally Graham, The Cry of Rape: The Prompt Complaint Doctrine and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 19 WILLIAMErrm L.J. 489 (1983).
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buts the natural inference of fabrication that a jury would draw
from a failure to promptly complain; a jury would expect a prompt
complaint if the sexual abuse really happened."6
2. NOT APPEARING AND UNAVAILABLE WITNESSES.
In exploring the application of the confrontation clause, it is
helpful to consider the not appearing and unavailable witnesses8'
categories simultaneously.
In California v. Green,3" as introduced above, the United
States Supreme Court was called upon to decide the admissibility
of preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness, the
court treating Porter's alleged lapse of memory as constituting un-
availability for the purpose of addressing the question. Noting that
Porter was under oath at the preliminary hearing and that Green
had the right to cross-examine Porter at that time, the Supreme
Court held that substantive admissibility of Porter's preliminary
hearing testimony did not violate the defendant's right of
confrontation:
We also think that Porter's preliminary hearing testimony
was admissible as far as the constitution is concerned wholly
apart from the question of whether respondent had an effective
opportunity for confrontation at the subsequent trial. For
Porter's statement at the preliminary hearing had already been
given under circumstances closely approximating those that sur-
round the typical trial. Porter was under oath; respondent was
represented by counsel-the same counsel in fact who later rep-
resented him at the trial; respondent had every opportunity to
cross-examine Porter as to his statement; and the proceedings
were conducted before a judicial tribunal, equipped to provide ajudicial record of the hearings.
.. . In the present case respondent's counsel does not ap-
pear to have been significantly limited in any way in the scope
or nature of his cross-examination of the witness Porter at the
preliminary hearing. If Porter had died or was otherwise un-
available, the Confrontation Clause would not have been vio-
lated by admitting his testimony given at the preliminary hear-
ing-the right of cross-examination then afforded provides
substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confronta-
36. Id. at 492-93.
37, For a description of the circumstances that make a witness unavailable, see infra
Section III B(1).
38. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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tion requirement, as long as the declarant's inability to give live
testimony is in no way the fault of the State.
... As in the case where the witness is physically un-
producible, the State here has made every effort to introduce its
evidence through the live testimony of the witness; it produced
Porter at trial, swore him as a witness, and tendered him for
cross-examination. Whether Porter then testified in a manner
consistent or inconsistent with his preliminary hearing testi-
mony, claimed a loss of memory, claimed his privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination or simply refused to answer, noth-
ing in the Confrontation Clause prohibited the State from also
relying on his prior testimony to prove its case against Green.""
As the foregoing quotation indicates, under Green defendants
must have an opportunity to effectively cross-examine the witness;
opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hearing is not per
se adequate. Ordinarily, however, unless the defense was limited
by "unusual circumstances," the cross-examination opportunity
provided in the typical preliminary hearing will be sufficient. Obvi-
ously the question of an adequate opportunity to conduct cross-
examination would arise if a child witness capable of direct exami-
nation falls apart and answers incoherently, inconsistently, claims
lack of recollection, or answers not at all when asked questions on
cross-examination, even calmly presented simple questions in child
understandable language.
Decisions interpreting Green have generally agreed that the is-
sue turns on whether the defense had the opportunity to cross-
examine effectively, not whether defense counsel actually engaged
in an extensive cross-examination. Nevertheless, the issue has not
been totally resolved. In Ohio v. Roberts,'40 decided in 1980, the
Supreme Court held that, under Green, a court could admit pre-
liminary hearing testimony, offered by the prosecution, of an un-
available witness who had been called by the defense at the pre-
liminary hearing and examined as a hostile witness. Although, in
Roberts, defense counsel never formally asked the court to declare
the witness hostile or to allow him to cross-examine, that is, lead
and impeach, his questions were the functional equivalent of cross-
examination. The Supreme Court noted that in his "direct exami-
nation," counsel challenged the witness' perception of events and
her veracity and had not been limited "in any way" in this line of
questioning. The result was, as in Green, a "substantial compliance
39. Id. at 165-69.
40. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement. ' 41 The
Supreme Court added, however, that in light of the facts before it,
there was no need to determine whether Green would have applied
if defense counsel had not actually engaged in extensive question-
ing of the witness. 4'
Six months after Green, in Dutton v. Evans,3 the Supreme
Court held that a defendant's right of confrontation was not vio-
lated when the trial court admitted, under a Georgia coconspirator
hearsay exception, an out of court declaration of a nonappearing
but available witness. Three men, Truett, Williams, and Evans,
were charged with the murder of three police officers. Truett was
granted immunity in return for his testimony. Williams and Evans
were indicted for the murders and tried separately. At Evans' trial,
there were 20 prosecution witnesses, but Truett's testimony was
the most damaging. He testified that he, Williams, and Evans were
stealing a car when three police officers confronted them; they
seized a gun from one of the officers and used it to murder all
three. One of Williams' fellow prisoners, a man named Shaw, also
testified. Shaw said that when Williams returned to the cell after
arraignment, he asked Williams how he made out in court. Accord-
ing to Shaw, Williams responded, "If it hadn't been for that dirty
son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." Although
Williams was available to either side, he was not called to testify at
Evans' trial. Defense counsel objected to Shaw's testimony on the
grounds that it was hearsay and that it violated Evans' right of
confrontation.
The trial court admitted the testimony pursuant to the Geor-
gia statutory coconspirator hearsay exception4 5 and overruled the
confrontation clause objection. Defense counsel then cross-ex-
amined Shaw at length. Evans was convicted; the Georgia courts
upheld the conviction on direct appeal. A federal district court de-
nied Evans' writ of habeas corpus, but the Fifth Circuit reversed,
holding that admission of Shaw's testimony under the Georgia
coconspirator hearsay exception violated Evans' right of
confrontation. 46
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice
41. Id. at 71.
42. Id. at 70.
43. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
44. Id. at 77.
45. GA. CODE ANN. § 38.306 (1954).
46. Dutton v. Evans, 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968).
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Stewart began the plurality opinion with a careful reminder that
the confrontation clause was not a codification of the common law
rule of hearsay and its exceptions, nor did the confrontaion clause
render all hearsay inadmissible. He rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the Georgia coconsiprator hearsay exception was consti-
tutionally invalid because it did not conform to the federal excep-
tion.47 Justice Stewart indicated that the issue before the Court
was whether the "mission" of the confrontation clause was
satisfied:
The decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of the
Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the
accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by
assuring that "the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for eval-
uating the truth of the prior statement. 4 8
In Green, the Supreme Court remanded for a determination of
whether the declarant's lack of recollection at trial "so affected"
the defendant's opportunity to cross-examine that the defendant
was deprived of his right of confrontation. In Evans, the defendant
had no opportunity to even attempt to cross-examine the declarant
because he was physically absent from trial, not just practically
unavailable, as in Green. According to Justice Stewart, however,
the issue in Evans was no longer the existence of an opportunity
for full and effective cross-examination, but whether the "trier of
fact (had] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement." Although Justice Stewart's opinion is abstruse, he ap-
pears to have looked to the criteria of certainty of making, indicia
of reliability, and probative impact, to determine whether the jury
had a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the out of court
statement.'9
Justice Stewart initially found that the jury had a satisfactory
basis for evaluating whether Williams actually made the statement
to Shaw. Shaw was present in court and defense counsel effectively
cross-examined him on the question of whether he actually heard
Williams make the statement. According to Justice Stewart, the
opportunity to cross-examine the reporting witness, while the wit-
ness was under oath and in the presence of the ultimate trier of
fact, was a sufficient guarantee of certainty of making."
47. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
48. Id. at 89 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
49. 400 U.S. at 89.
50. Id. at 88.
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Stewart next found that Williams' statement possessed those
indicia of reliability "widely viewed as determinative" of whether a
statement should be placed before the jury without confrontation
of the declarant. The statement contained no express assertion of
past fact and consequently carried on its face a warning to the jury
against giving the statement more than the little probative value it
deserved. Williams' personal knowledge of the facts surrounding
the murder was well established. There was little likelihood that
Williams had faulty recollection of the crime. The circumstances
under which Williams made the statement negated any motive to
misrepresent. Although in Green, the court had quoted Wigmore
to characterize cross-examination as "the greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth,"'" in Evans, Justice Stewart
summarily dismissed as "wholly unreal"52 the possibility that
cross-examination of Williams would have aided the jury in deter-
mining whether his statement might have been untrustworthy.
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Evans is exceptionally
unclear concerning the standard a court should apply to determine
the constitutional admissibility of an out of court statement of an
available but not appearing declarant. Justice Stewart was con-
cerned with providing the trier of fact with a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of the prior statement. He looked to the indi-
cia of reliability possessed by the statement, the factors establish-
ing certainty that the statement was made and the importance of
the statement in the litigation, but he failed to advise lower courts
of the proper weight to accord each of these factors. For example,
it is not apparent whether Justice Stewart intended an evaluation
of incremental probative value to be an independent criterion in
the confrontation analysis, or whether he was merely stating that
any error in admitting Williams's statement was harmless. More-
over, even if incremental probative value is a relevant criterion,
Stewart's opinion is still unclear as to whether all crucial hearsay
statements must be excluded, or whether necessary hearsay may
nevertheless be admitted if indicia of reliability are adequately
established. 8
In Ohio v. Roberts," the court answered the questions left
51. 399 U.S. at 158.
52. 400 U.S. at 89.
53. With respect to questions that relate to the admissibility of confessions of co-defen-
dants discussed under the rubric of the confrontation clause, see Parker v. Randolph, 442
U.S. 62 (1979); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
54. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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open in Evans. In Roberts, the defendant was charged with forgery
of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and with possession of
stolen credit cards belonging to Isaacs and his wife. At a prelimi-
nary hearing, defense counsel called Isaac's daughter, Anita, to es-
tablish that she had permitted the defendant to use her apartment
and to attempt to get her to admit that she had given the defen-
dant the checks and the credit cards without informing him that
she did not have permission to use them. Anita denied giving the
defendant the items. The government issued five subpoenas to
Anita for four different dates. She was not at her residence and did
not appear at the trial.
After the preliminary hearing, the defense counsel resigned to
accept an appointment as municipal county judge. New counsel
appeared at trial. The defendant testified that Anita had given him
her parents' checkbook and credit cards. On rebuttal, relying on an
Ohio rule of evidence which permits a party to use the preliminary
examination testimony of a witness "who cannot for any reason be
produced at trial," the state offered the preliminary hearing tran-
script of Anita's testimony."' At a voir dire hearing, the trial court
determined that Anita was unavailable because no one knew of her
whereabouts. The preliminary hearing testimony was received into
evidence.56
The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's convic-
tion, holding that the state made insufficient efforts to find Anita.
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the reversal on a different
ground, after declaring that the trial court could reasonably infer
from testimony at voir dire that due diligence to procure Anita's
attendance had been shown. The supreme court determined that
the transcript was inadmissible because the mere opportunity to
cross-examine at a preliminary hearing did not afford the defen-
dant his constitutional right of confrontation for purposes of
trial.57 At the preliminary hearing, since defense counsel did not
ask the court to declare Anita hostile, and thus subject to cross-
examination, the lack of actual cross-examination violated defen-
dant's confrontation right.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the de-
cision of the Ohio Supreme Court and found the preliminary hear-
ing testimony admissible. The Supreme Court reasoned that with
55. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §2945.49 (1975).
56. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
57. State v. Roberts, 55 Ohio St. 2d 191, 378 N.E.2d 492 (1978).
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respect to former testimony, the confrontation clause establishes a
preference for a face to face confrontation. Thus the prosecution
must produce the declarant or establish his or her unavailability.
Moreover, every hearsay statement of either an available or un-
available witness, whether or not crucial to a case, must possess
"indicia of reliability" to be admitted.' Pursuant to Green, prior
consistent and inconsistent statements of a witness testifying at
trial possess the necessary "indicia of reliability," because the de-
clarant is under oath, is testifying before the trier of fact, and is
subject to cross-examination. As to the not appearing or unavaila-
ble declarant, the Supreme Court said:
The Court has applied this "indicia of reliability" requirement
principally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions rest
upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evi-
dence within them comports with the "substance of the consti-
tutional protection." . . This reflects the "truism that hearsay
rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to
protect similar values," . . . "and stem from the same roots,"
... . It also responds to the need for certainty in the workaday
world of conducting criminal trials.
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires
a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is
admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reli-
ability can be inferred without more in a case where the evi-
dence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
The Supreme Court found that defense counsel's method of direct
examination gave Anita's testimony the necessary "indicia of relia-
bility" to satisfy the confrontation clause. Although defense
counsel did not have Anita declared a hostile witness, counsel did
explore her perception of events and her veracity in detail.
The Supreme Court found that the change of attorneys was
irrelevant.2
The Supreme Court delineated several important doctrines in
Roberts. Although it declined to map out a theory of the confron-
tation clause that would determine the validity of all hearsay ex-
ceptions, the Supreme Court stated, without qualification, that a
58. 448 U.S. at 65-67.
59. Id. at 64-65.
60. Id. at 72.
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trial court may admit into evidence a hearsay statement of a wit-
ness not called at trial only if the statement bears adequate "indi-
cia of reliability." Adequate "indicia of reliability," 6' however, can
be "inferred without mQre" when evidence falls squarely within a
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception.2 Among the "firmly rooted"
hearsay exceptions are the following: (1) the common law hearsay
exception for former testimony codified in Rule 804(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence; (2) each of the hearsay exceptions spe-
cifically denominated in Rule 803, where unavailability is not re-
quired; (3) the remaining specifically denominated Rule 804 excep-
tions which require unavailability (with the possible exception of
statements against penal interest, Rule 801(b)(3)); 5 and (4) the
Rule 801(d)(2) designation of an admission by a party opponent as
"not hearsay" (with the possible exception of statements of cocon-
spirator, Rule 801(d)(2)(E))."'
Although, generally, statements not falling within a traditional
61. Adequate "indicia of reliability" must be established with regard to whether or not
the not appearing witness must also be shown to be unavailable.
62. Id. at 66.
63. The cases are conflicting as to whether a statement against penal interest, offered to
inculpate or exculpate under Rule 804(b)(3), falls within the firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tions of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), or must be shown to possess particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. Compare United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769 (2nd
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 704 (1984) (firmly rooted) with Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d
421 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1009 (1982) (particularized guarantees). For other
decisions requiring a showing of particularized guarantees, see Maugeri v. State, 460 So. 2d
975 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); State v. Paris, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 77 (1982). The question
may lack practical significance if the requirement of Rule 804(b)(3), that corroborating cir-
cumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of exculpating statements, applied to incul-
pating statements as well by the courts equates with a showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness.
64. Admissions of a party-opponent that are exempt from the operation of the rule
against hearsay by Rule 801(d)(2) form a possible exception because admissibility is based
upon the adversary system rather than an assessment of trustworthiness. At the current
time, it is problematic whether statements admitted pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2), and in par-
ticular, Rule 801(d)(2)(E), fall within the "firmly rooted" hearsay exception category of Rob-
erts. See United States v. Caputo, 758 F.2d 944, 951-52 (3rd. Cir. 1985). In this case, the
court commented, "[i]n holding the Roberts 'unavailability' and 'reliability' requirements
fully applicable to the admissions of coconspirators who do not testify in court, we are
joined by other Courts of Appeals that have decided this question." Judge Sloviter wrote a
strong dissent in which he argued that Roberts only applies to those hearsay exceptions that
require unavailability at common law. For a full view, see United States v. Williams, 737
F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985). In Williams the court held
that "challenges to co-conspirators' statements should be based on the requirements of Rule
801(d)(2)(E), not on the Sixth Amendment." 737 F.2d at 610. See also United States v.
McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The Circuits are split as to whether com-
pliance with Rule 801(d)(2)(E) automatically satisfies the Sixth Amendment require-
ments."). See also infra note 73.
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"firmly rooted" hearsay exception must be excluded, the Supreme
Court provided for the admission of such statements if they pos-
sess "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" that are equal
to the circumstantial guarantees of statements admitted pursuant
to the "firmly rooted" traditional hearsay exceptions. Notably, the
Kansas, Washington and Florida statutes follow the Court's lan-
guage, which parallels the requirements of Rules 803(24) and
804(b)(5)." Under each of these statutes, as required by Roberts,
evidence can be admitted only if it possesses "particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness" equivalent to those possessed by the
traditional "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions. Thus, evidence
properly admitted pursuant to any of these or similar hearsay ex-
ceptions also meets the requirements of the confrontation clause.
According to the above quotation from Roberts, statements
falling within a Federal Rule of Evidence 803 hearsay exception, as
well as those statements defined as "not hearsay" in Rule
801(d)(2), may be admitted against a criminal defendant "nor-
mally" only if the government produces the declarant for direct
and cross-examination at trial, or makes a sufficient showing that
the declarant is not available to testify. Taken literally, almost
every hearsay statement that meets an exception in Rule 803, and
every statement defined as "not hearsay" in Rule 801(d)(2), would
seem to require either production of the declarant, or a showing of
unavailability before the statement can be received in evidence
against the accused.6
Several factors, however, indicate that the Supreme Court did
not contemplate such radical change in practice. First, the Court
discussed its interpretation of the confrontation clause in the con-
text of a discussion of Rule 804(b)(1), the former testimony hear-
say exception. This exception requires unavailability. The casual
nature of the comment with respect to unavailability, in the con-
text of a hearsay exception requiring unavailability, belies any in-
tention to make a radical change in the law. More importantly, in
Roberts the Court clearly states that while the confrontation clause
"normally requires" a showing of unavailability, "competing inter-
ests . . . may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial. ' '67
The Court specifically recognized that the requirement of face to
face confrontation must sometimes give way to "considerations of
65. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
66. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
67. Id. at 64.
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public policy and the necessities of the case."66 The opinion also
indicates that parties need not demonstrate unavailability or pro-
duce the declarant when the utility of confrontation is remote.1e It
is interesting to note that, generally speaking, neither the state
courts, the United States Courts of Appeal, nor the leading com-
mentators on the Federal Rules of Evidence have construed Rob-
erts as ushering in a radical change. For example, United States v.
Yakobov 70 holds that evidence of the absence of a public record
may be introduced against the criminal defendant under Rule
803(10) without production of the available records custodian or
any other available witness. 1 Finally, it would be completely out of
character with the other Supreme Court decisions including Evans,
to read the "normally requires" language of Roberts as a require-
ment of either unavailability or production with respect to almost
every hearsay statement offered against a criminal defendant pur-
suant to Rule 803.
In summary, it is very clear that an available declarant need
not always be called by the prosecution at trial to testify before a
prior hearsay statement, which meets either a traditional "firmly
68. Id. at 64 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
69. Id. at 65.
70. 712 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1983). See also United States v. Hans, 684 F.2d 343, 346 (6th
Cir. 1982) ("The district court acknowledged that the checks were exceptions to the hearsay
rule under Rule 803(6) and Rule 803(8), both of which could be utilized 'even though the
declarant is available as a witness.' Clearly Roberts does not support exclusion of the instant
checks.").
71. Cf. United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1984):
The record also raises serious questions about Brimberry's availability. The gov-
ernment recognized on the record that Brimberry had offered to testify. In Rob-
erts, the Supreme Court stated 'if there is a possibility, albeit remote, that af-
firmative measures might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith
may demand their effectuation.' Thus, the government may have been obligated
to make Brimberry available for cross-examination in order to use his out-of-
court statements in conformity with the confrontation clause....
This raises the additional question, not pressed by the government in its
brief, of whether the confrontation clause prevents the use of hearsay statements
when the declarant is available to both sides. Two Ninth Circuit pre-Roberts
cases imply that it does not .... We read Roberts, however, to place the burden
on the government to make available for cross-examination a witness whose out-
of-court statements it is using against the defendant. The Court stated: '[A] wit-
ness is not unavailable for purposes of. . .the exception to the confrontation re-
quirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have make a good faith effort to
obtain his presence at trial 0 0 " .' Thus, it is the government's burden to ob-
tain the available hearsay declarant's presence at trial, although it need not call
the witness to testify.
Id. at 640 & n.6 (citations omitted).
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rooted" hearsay exception or possesses equivalent particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness, may be admitted against the ac-
cused in evidence in satisfaction of the confrontation clause. It is
abundantly clear that the "normally requires" language of Roberts
does apply to prior statements of alleged victims of sexual abuse
accusing the defendant of the charged offense. If the confrontation
clause means anything, it must mean the right of the defendant to
confront complaining "witnesses against him" who are available to
testify.7' Thus, none of the exceptions alluded to by the Supreme
Court in Roberts to justify nonproduction of an available declarant
would or should apply to Alice's statements that Sam rubbed his
hand on her genitals.
3. SYNOPSIS
The interpretation of the confrontation clause developed in
Green, Evans, and Roberts allows introduction, as substantive evi-
dence, of all prior out of court hearsay statements of a witness who
is called at trial by the prosecution and testifies subject to cross-
examination, whether the hearsay statement is consistent or incon-
sistent with the witness' in-court testimony.78 If the witness is
72. Instead of trying to determine whether "competing interests," "public policy," .ne-
cessity," or "remoteness" should dispense with the requirement of production of an availa-
ble declarant, it has been suggested that the better approach is to judge imposition of the
requirement of showing unavailability by the circumstances under which the statement was
made. See Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Wit-
ness, 56 Tix. L. Rev. 151 (1978):
Under this approach, when the Government offers an out-of-court statement
pursuant to a hearsay exception, the confrontation clause requires the Govern-
ment to produce the declarant only if he is available and then only if the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the statement indicate that it was accusatory
in nature when made. If the out-of-court statement was accusatory when made,
the declarant is a witness 'against' defendant. Conversely, if the out-of-court
statement was not accusatory, the declarant is not a witness 'against' defendant,
and the confrontation clause has no application.
A statement is accusatory in nature under this analysis if it is made
under circumstances that evidence, first, an intent of the declarant to accuse or
charge someone with conduct that is criminal, or second, an awareness by the
declarant of a reasonable possibility that the statement may be of assistance to
the Government in the apprehension or prosecution of any person who may be
charged with having committed any crime.
d. at 192.
73. Thus with respect to an out of court statement offered under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), if
the declarant testifies at trial, under Green, the court clearly need not make an ad hoc
search for circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; oath, demeanor, and cross-examina-
tion before the trier of fact suffice to meet the confrontation clause's requirement of indicia
of reliability.
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available but does not appear, certain hearsay statements which
meet a traditional "firmly rooted" hearsay exception or which are
shown on a particularized basis to be sufficiently trustworthy may
nevertheless be admitted where the utility of confrontation is re-
mote or the competing interests of public policy and the necessities
of the case warrant admission. Hearsay statements in the "normal"
case, however, which certainly includes out of court statements of
alleged victims which accuse the defendant of committing the
crime for which he is on trial, are admissible under the confronta-
tion clause only if the available declarant is produced at trial. Such
hearsay statements are, of course, admissible only is they meet the
requirements of a traditional "firmly rooted" hearsay exception or
are shown to possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
possessed by statements admitted pursuant to the traditional
"firmly rooted" exceptions.
D. Proposed Hearsay Exception
The following proposed hearsay exception for children's out of
court statements that describe sexual contact draws upon various
common law and emerging statutory hearsay exceptions:
A statement made by a child, when under the age of ,
describing an act of sexual contact performed with or on the
child by another is admissible in evidence in criminal proceed-
ings, civil proceedings, and dependency and deliquency proceed-
ings in juvenile court if:
(1) The child testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the
statement
(a) is consistent with the child's testimony and is one of
initial complaint, or
(b) (i) is inconsistent with his testimony, and
(ii) was made by a child possessing personal knowl-
edge of the sexual conduct described, and
(iii)(1) is proved to have been made under oath
subject to penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other pro-
ceeding or in a deposition, or
(2) the statement is proved to have been writ-
ten or signed by the child, or
(3) the making of the statement is acknowl-
edged to have been made either (a) by the child in his testimony
in the present proceeding or (b) by the child under oath subject
to the penalty of perjury at a prior trial, hearing, or other pro-
ceeding or in a deposition, or
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(4) the statement is proved to have been accu-
rately recorded by a tape recorder, videotape recorder, or any
other similar electronic means of sound recording, provided
further
(iv) there is adequate corroborative evidence intro-
duced at trial of the act of sexual contact described in the state-
ment, or
(2) The testimony of the child is unavailable at the trial or
hearing and the statement
(a) was made by a child possessing personal knowledge
of the sexual conduct described, and
(b) the statement possesses circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness equivalent to that possessed by statements
admitted pursuant to a firmly rooted hearsay exception, and
(c) the proponent of the statement notifies the adverse
party of his intention to offer the statement and the particulars
of it, including the name and address of the declarant, suffi-
ciently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, provided
further,
(d) there is adequate corroborative evidence introduced
at trial of the act of sexual contact described in the statement.
1. TRUSTWORTHINESS
Proposed Rule 1(a) constitutes a modification of the common
law doctrine of prompt complaint. Under the proposed rule, the
child victim of prohibited sexual contact must testify at trial in a
manner consistent with the content of the initial complaint, and
must be subject to cross-examination. If the child fails to so testify
at trial, for example, if the child is physically unavailable, fails to
recall the event, or testifies to a version that differs from the al-
leged initial complaint, the initial complaint would fail to meet the
requirements of proposed Rule 1(a). The presence of the witness in
court under oath, subject to cross-examination, coupled with con-
sistency between the witness' in court testimony and the witness'
statement of initial complaint, clearly justifies substantive admis-
sibility.
Under proposed Rule 1(a), the court may admit the initial
complaint of the child victim as substantive evidence on direct ex-
amination. Moreover, in contradistinction to the common law, the
initial complaint need not be "prompt"; delay in making the com-
plaint does not affect admissibility. Instead, delay is a factor to be
weighed in assessing the credibility of the witness. Proposed Rule
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1(a) also resolves a continuing problem concerning the scope of ad-
missibility of victim complaint evidence: whether admissibility
should be limited to the fact of the complaint or should instead
encompass details including the name of the alleged assailant. Rule
1(a) would simply allow the trial court to admit as substantive evi-
dence all details actually contained in the initial complaint. The
common law has already moved significantly in this direction. In-
creasingly, courts allow more background details; some courts even
admit the identity of the assailant. Permitting admissibility of all
details actually contained in the initial complaint gives the jury a
more complete picture of what actually transpired. When only the
mere fact of the complaint is admitted, the jury receives very little
useful information to guide them in determining the weight to give
the complaint. By permitting admissibility of all details actually
stated at the time of initial complaint, the proposed rule would
give the factfinder the maximum amount of information with
which to assess the credibility of the initial complaint evidence and
the overall credibility of the child witness.
While proposed Rule 1(a) would admit the fact of the com-
plaint and its details, it would limit admission to the initial outcry,
which is the earliest prior statement, and thus, the most useful in
assessing the credibility of the child victim. Any subsequent com-
plaint would be considered inadmissible hearsay unless it met the
requirements of one of the remaining subsections of the proposed
rule, the excited utterance hearsay exception, the requirements for
a prior consistent statement, or another hearsay exception or defi-
nition of "not hearsay" contained in the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
Proposed Rule 1(b) constitutes a modification of Rule
801(d)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
provides for the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements given under oath, subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or at a deposition. Proposed
Rule 1(b) expands significantly, but with limitation, the substan-
tive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements made by child
witnesses that describes an act of sexual conduct performed with
or on the child by another. Proposed Rule 1(b) would permit intro-
duction of prior inconsistent statements clearly shown to have
been made, where an opportunity exists at trial to examine the
witness in order to expose and counteract any impropriety that
may have occurred during the taking of the statement, such as co-
ercion, deception, or subtle influences. Proposed Rule 1(b) imposes
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a requirement that the child declarant possess personel knowledge
of the sexual conduct described.74 Considered as a whole, proposed
Rule 1(b) adequately ensures that the witness made the prior in-
consistent statement, and that the trustworthiness of the prior in-
consistent statement can be explored at trial. At the same time,
proposed Rule 1(b) excludes the most untrustworthy declaration,
the unacknowledged oral statement. In addition, proposed Rule
1(b) permits the prior inconsistent statement to be admitted only
if there is adequate corroborative evidence or the sexual contact
described in the statement. The significance of the corroboration
requirement will be discussed later, in connection with proposed
Rule 2, which deals with the prior statement of an unavailable
child.
Certain other provisions of proposed Rule 1(b) deserve specific
mention. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence does
not permit substantive admissibility of a witness' statement when,
at trial, the witness acknowledges making, but denies the truth of,
an inconsistent statement. In contrast, proposed subsection
1(b)(iii)(3)(a) would allow substantive admissibility of this incon-
sistent statement. In addition, proposed subsection 1(b)(iii)(3)(b)
provides for substantive admission of a prior oral statement, the
making of which the witness acknowledged while testifying at a
prior trial, hearing, other proceeding, or deposition, even if the wit-
ness had denied its truth at that time. Thus, subject to the re-
quirement of personal knowledge, if a child witness at a current
trial appeared at a prior formal proceeding and acknowledged that
he or she made a particular oral inconsistent statement, under the
proposal, the statement would be admissible substantively in the
present trial even if the child now testifies that he or she never
made the prior oral statement and that it is untrue.
Whenever a child has not and will not acknowledge making a
prior oral statement, proposed Rules (1)(b)(iii)(1), (2), and (4) re-
74. The requirement that the witness have had personal knowledge of the event or con-
dition the prior inconsistent statement narrates, describes, or explains, proposed Rule (1)
(b) (ii), has two very important consequences. First, only a child witness with personal
knowledge of the subject matter of a prior inconsistent statement can be examined about
whether the statement is truthful. Second, the requirement excludes from evidence all prior
statements of a child witness that merely narrate a third person's declaration unless the
child also has personal knowledge of the facts underlying the third person's statement. Thus
a child's prior statement that he heard a criminal defendant make an incriminating admis-
sion would be inadmissible as substantive evidence unless the child had personal knowledge
of the incriminating conduct itself. The personal knowledge requirement excludes from evi-
dence those statements most open to fabrication by the child while concurrently assuring
the opportunity for effective cross-examination.
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quire proof that the statement was made at a formal proceeding,
was written or signed by the child, or was accurately electronically
recorded. Introduction of evidence sufficient to support a jury find-
ing that the child made the prior inconsistent out of court state-
ment. Rather, the litigant must initially satisfy the court that it is
more probably true than not true that the statement was in fact
made. An in court declarant who denies making a prior inconsis-
tent statement will necessarily be testifying under oath, therefore,
the proposal justifiably imposes a greater requirement of certainty
that the child made the statement. Such direct testamentary con-
tradiction is not often present with respect to authentication of
writings or recordings that are admitted pursuant to the doctrine
of conditional relevance. Given the nature of the prior inconsistent
statements that fall within the proposed rule, it is probable that
even a child, especially after reviewing his or her statement, will
seldom deny making the statement, although the possibility of
forged signatures or alteration of the prior written or recorded
statement creates a potential for dispute. Ultimately, the decision
about whether the statement was made rests with the jury.
Although proposed Rule 1(b) requires that the proponent bear
the burden of proof that it is more probably true than not true
that the statement was the exact statement the child wrote, signed,
or recorded, the proponent should not be required to bear this bur-
den of proof regarding other contested matters relating to the
statement. The jury, under the concept of conditional relevancy,
must resolve any special problems such as distortion of the signed
statement by subtle word variations, complete omissions, or
fabricated additions by the person preparing the statement for the
child to sign, uncritical signing, and subtle influences such as the
child's desire to please another person. After the jury has heard
the allegations presented by the child and others in court, and has
listened to cross-examination of the person who obtained the prior
statement, the jury has the task of judging the credibility of each
witness and of deciding what, in fact, occurred when the prior
statement was allegedly made. If the child asserts that a prior
statement was made involuntarily, however, under the proposed
rule, the proponent of the statement would be required to convince
the court that it is more probably true than not true that the state-
ment was not coerced.
In summary, proposed Rule 1(b), to the extent justified by
concerns for certainty of making and circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, increases the breadth of prior inconsistent state-
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ments that describe an act of sexual contact admitted as substan-
tive evidence when the child is available for cross-examination.
The proposed rule also makes it easy for police officers, social
workers, specially trained interviewers, and prosecuting attorneys
to promptly preserve an out of court statement of a child witness
for admission at trial against the possibility of changed testimony
by video or tape recording the child's oral statement, or by having
the child, if old enough, either prepare a handwritten statement or
execute a written statement prepared by another.
Proposed Rule 2 provides for the substantive admissibility of
prior statements of a child that describe an act of sexual contact
performed with or on the child by another where the child's testi-
mony is unavailable at trial and (a) the child is shown to possess
personal knowledge of the sexual conduct described 7 5 (b) the
statement is shown to possess circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness equivalent to that possessed by statements admitted
pursuant to a traditional "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, (c) ad-
vance notice of intent to offer the statement is given, and (d) ade-
quate corroborative evidence of the sexual conduct described in
the statement is introduced at trial. Proposed Rule 2 generally
conforms with the proposal of the National Legal Resource Center
for Child Advocacy and Protection as incorporated by Washington
Revised Code Section 9A.44.120. The proposed rule adds the re-
quirement that the child possess personal knowledge and it bor-
rows a notice provision from Rule 804(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Proposed Rule 2 also rewords the requirement of trust-
worthiness to parallel Rule 804(b)(5) and Roberts. It retains the
requirement of corroboration of the act of sexual contact.
Whether a child's hearsay statement is accompanied by suffi-
cient particularized guarantees of trustworthiness turns on the
facts of the case. As previously mentioned, in conducting a similar
inquiry under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5),
courts have looked to several criteria: (1) certainty that the state-
ment was made, which should include an assessment of the credi-
bility of the person testifying in court to the statement;7 ' (2) assur-
75. The personal knowledge requirement excludes from evidence all prior statements of
a child that merely narrate a third person's declaration unless the child also has personal
knowledge of the facts underlying the third person's statement. Thus a child witness' state-
ment that he heard a criminal defendant make an incriminating admission would be inad-
missible as substantive evidence unless the child had personal knowledge of the incriminat-
ing conduct itself.
76. It is questionable whether expert witness testimony should be admissible on the
issue of trustworthiness. The availability of expert witness opinions going in both directions
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ance of the declarant's personal knowledge of the underlying event;
(3) whether the statement was made under oath; (4) the practical
availability of the declarant at trial for meaningful cross-examina-
tion concerning the underlying event [obviously not applicable to
Rule 804(b)(5)]; and (5) an ad hoc ascertainment of trustworthi-
ness. This ad hoc assessment is to be based upon the totality of the
surrounding circumstances, including corroborating facts such as
physical evidence, inconsistent facts, and the assessed credibility of
the declarant, all considered in the light of the traditional "firmly
rooted" exceptions to the hearsay rule. The following factors are
relevant and bear upon the determination of trustworthiness of a
child's statement that describes an act of sexual contact: (1) the
child's partiality, that is, interest, bias, corruption, or coercion; (2)
the presence or absence of time to fabricate;"7 (3) the physical and
mental condition of the child when the statement was made;78 (4)
suggestiveness, brought on by the use of leading questions coupled
with an evaluation of the child's relationship to the questioner,
considered in light of surrounding circumstances;7 9 (5) the age of
should make the court reluctant to open the flood gates to such testimony. See infra note 90
and text accompanying notes 92-95. Moreover, it is questionable whether such testimony is
helpful because it only addresses the issue of trustworthiness, it does not address the psy-
chological manifestations indicative of child sexual abuse syndrome. Contra State v. Myatt,
237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836 (1985):
In this case there were sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to support
admission of the hearsay statements. The State's expert witness-an M.D. spe-
cializing in child psychiatry--concluded that the child's statements were relia-
ble. He spent four 50-minute sessions with the child and spoke with her foster
parents and teacher. At the doctor's request, the child demonstrated what had
happened with anatomically correct dolls. The doctor could discern no motive
for falsification and concluded that she knew the difference between right and
wrong and her statements were reliable.
Id. at.. 697 P.2d at 844.
77. A court is more likely to admit statements made soon after the event than state-
ments made after a substantial lapse of time. Similarly, initial statements are more easily
admitted than subsequent statements. Nevertheless, although time and sequence are impor-
tant, they are not preclusive because delay in reporting and vacillation are commonly associ-
ated with complaints of child sexual abuse.
78. It is appropriate to consider the child's chronological age, mental age, and maturity
in order to determine the child's physical and mental condition at the time he or she made
the statement.
79. Compare State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836, (1985) ("[Ilt is highly unlikely
that a child will persist in lying to his or her parents, or other figures of authority about
sexual abuse.") with State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 140, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).
(Als regards timing, both mothers had been told of the strong likelihood that the
defendant had committed indecent liberties upon their children before the
mothers questioned their children. They were arguably predisposed to confirm
what they had been told. Their relationship to their children is understandably
of a character which makes their objectivity questionable.
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the child; (6) the nature and duration of the sexual contact; (7) the
relationship of the child and the accused; and (8) whether the child
has reaffirmed or recanted the statement. Matters of particular im-
portance in determining the trustworthiness of a young child's
hearsay statement include: (1) whether the child is likely, apart
from the incident, to have sufficient knowledge of sexual matters to
realize that sexual contact is both possible and sexually gratifying
to some individuals;" (2) whether the child's statement describes
an embarassing event that a child would normally not relate unless
true;8 l (3) whether the language is appropriate for the child's age;
and (4) whether the child's statement is a cry for help."
Id. at , 691 P.2d at 205.
The problem of command suggestiveness by a person in authority, particularly a
mother involved in a custody dispute, should not be underestimated. It is possible that a
child's statement alleging sexual abuse resulted from a desire to please, from fear, or from
uncritical acceptance of what the child perceives the authority figure believes happened.
With very young children it is possible that over time, the child may accept the suggested
event as true and recall it as if it had really occured. See Miami Herald, July 28, 1985
(Tropic Magazine), at 11-13 (describing questionable accusations as "epidemic" and quoting
Dianne Schetky, a child psychiatrist in Connecticut, as stating about false accusations: "A
child can be very impressionable. They want to believe their parents. And if Mommy says
Daddy abused you... the child is not per se lying. He is brainwashed .... Children are
very suggestible. I have seen interviews where the interrogators put words in the child's
mouth."). See also infra text accompanying note 86.
80. State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17,-., 697 P.2d 836, 841 (1985) ("[Clhildren do not have
enough knowledge about sexual matters to lie about them."). But see supra note 79.
81. See Comment, Sexual Abuse of Children- Washington's New Hearsay Exception,
58 WASH. L Rav. 813 (1983).
To ensure that the statement is not admitted without the requisite guaran-
tees of trustworthiness, the hearing requirement of the new hearsay exception
should be construed broadly. The exception requires that the court hold a hear-
ing on the issue of reliability prior to admission of the statement. At the very
least, the court should thoroughly question the person who will testify concern-
ing the child's out-of-court statement, any other persons who heard the state-
ment, any persons who have knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
alleged sexual assault, and if possible, the child. During the questioning, the
court should attempt to determine: (1) the time lapse between the alleged sexual
act and the child's recital of the statement; (2) whether the statement was made
in response to a leading question; (3) whether either the child or the hearsay
witness has any bias against the defendant or any motive for fabricating the
statement or implicating the accused; (4) whether the statement was made while
the child was still upset or in pain because of the incident; (5) whether the ter-
minology of the statement was likely to have been used by a child the age of the
alleged victim; and (6) whether any event that occurred between the time of the
alleged act and the time the statement was made could have accounted for the
contents of the statement.
Id. at 827.
82. See State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836 (1985). The Myatt court said:
The determination of reliability and trustworthiness must be made on a
case-by-case basis. Such factors as the age of the child; his or her physical and
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The Washington statute, Section 9A.44.120, in its search for
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, requires considera-
tion of the time, content, and circumstances of the statement. The
Kansas statute, Section 60-460(d)(3), demands consideration of
whether the statement was made by the declarant at a time when
the matter had been recently perceived, whether the statement was
made in good faith prior to the commencement of the action, and
whether the statement was made with no incentive to falsify or
distort. Another Kansas statute, Section 40.460(d)(a), requires that
the court consider whether the child was induced by threats or
promises to falsely make the statement. A Florida Statute, Section
90.803(23), mandates consideration of the mental and physical age
and maturity of the child.
The Supreme Court of Washington, in State v. Ryan,8 listed
the following factors, originally set forth in State v. Parris,"' as
relevant in the search for particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness: (1) whether there is an apparent motive to lie; (2) the general
character of the declarant; (3) whether more than one person heard
the statement; (4) whether the statement was made spontaneously;
and (5) the timing of the declaration and the relationship between
the declarant and the witness. 8 In Ryan, two children, when ques-
tioned about the source of candy in their possession, first told a
story, then later recanted the story and stated that the defendant
had given it to them for permitting sexual contact. In applying the
factors, the court considered it important the fact that both chil-
dren's statements were made initially to only one person. The
court held that the children's hearsay statements were inadmissi-
ble. The court was strongly influenced by the fact that both
mothers solicited the initial statements after they learned of the
possibility that sexual contact had occurred. Implicit in the court's
reasoning is the belief that children are susceptible to suggestion
from persons they love or who have authority over them. The Ryan
court said:
Applying the Parris factors to the circumstances of the pre-
mental condition; the circumstances of the alleged event; the language used by
the child; the presence of corroborative evidence; the relationship of the accused
to the child; the child's family, school, and peer relationships; any motive to
falsify or distort the event; and the reliability of the testifying witness can be
examined.
Id. at _, 697 P.2d at 843. See also State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).
83. 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).
84. 98 Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 77 (1984).
85. 103 Wash. 2d at_, 691 P.2d at 205.
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sent case, the statements cannot be deemed sufficiently trust-
worthy to deprive the defendant of his right of confrontation.
First, there was a motive to lie, and each child initially told a
different version of the source of the candy they were not sup-
posed to have. Second, all the record reveals about the character
of the children is the parties' stipulation that the children were
incompetent witnesses due to their tender years. Third, the ini-
tial statements of the children were made to one person, al-
though subsequent repetitions were heard by others. Fourth, the
statements were not made spontaneously, but in response to
questioning. Fifth, as regards timing, both mothers had been
told of the strong likelihood that the defendant had committed
indecent liberties upon their children before the mothers ques-
tioned their children. They were arguably predisposed to con-
firm what they had been told. Their relationship to their chil-
dren is understandably of a character which makes their
objectivity questionable."
Applying the relevant factors, proponents will often succeed in
introducing the child's initial statement that describes the act of
sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, as well
as additional statements made immediately after the initial state-
ment. It is, however, extremely doubtful that a child's statement to
a police officer, social worker, or someone specially trained to inter-
view children will be found to possess equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, whether or not the statement was
videotaped or otherwise recorded. The normal timing of such an
interview, its investigative function, the frequent use of suggestive
questions by a person in authority, and the fact that the child will
usually have made several earlier statements relating to the alleged
sexual contact all militate against admissibility. Such investigatory
statements are somewhat analagous to grand jury testimony which
has received a checkered response when offered under Federal
Rule of Evidence Rule 804(b)(5). 7 A proponent can often, when
desirable, preserve the child's testimony against the possibility of
unavailability at trial by having the child testify, subject to cross-
examination, at a preliminary hearing or by means of a deposition.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 936 (1978) (finding grand jury testimony admissible). But see United States v. Gonza-
lez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding grand jury testimony inadmissible).
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2. CORROBORATION
An important feature of proposed Rule 2 is that to be admit-
ted in evidence, an unavailable child's hearsay statement must not
only be sufficiently trustworthy, it must also be corroborated by
evidence introduced at trial. The requirement of adequate corrobo-
ration applies only to evidence of the sexual conduct described in
the statement itself; proposed Rule 2 does not require corrobora-
tive evidence that the sexual conduct was committed by the ac-
cused.88 Recall that proposed Rule 1(b) also requires corroboration
with respect to prior inconsistent statements.
Neither considerations underlying the hearsay rule and its ex-
ceptions, nor considerations underlying the confrontation clause as
set forth in Roberts,89 require corroboration of the sexual contact
itself as a separate requirement to admissibility of a child's hearsay
statement. The corroboration requirement stems from a due pro-
cess concern that the trier of fact may be too willing to convict an
accused sexual offender, that is, find that the state has satisfied its
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, on the basis of evi-
dence of alleged out of court statements of children that describe
socially repugnant sexual contact. The requirement of corrobora-
tion also implicitly recognizes that judges may be too willing to
send such cases to the jury.
Let's take a worst case scenario. Assume that Alice is unavaila-
ble at trial because she is unable to recall the events in question.
Assume further that no corroboration exists, that is, the medical
examination reveals no abnormalities, the investigators find no
physical evidence at the scene, no other eyewitnesses are located,
and Sam does not confess. Neither evidence of lustful disposition,
where admissible, nor expert witness testimony relating to the
credibility, character, or psychological state of being'0 of either the
88. But see Comment, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions:
Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv. L. Rzv. 806, 821 (1985).
89. Section 2(b) of the proposed rule requires trustworthiness, "indicia of reliability,"
as mandated by Roberts. See State v. Rodriguez, 8 Kan. App. 2d 353, 657 P.2d 79 (1983);
State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).
90. Contra Comment, supra note 88, at 821:
[Tihe state must produce corroborative evidence of the abusive act itself and not
merely of the circumstances surrounding the act as described by the child. To
corroborate the abusive act the state may offer eyewitness testimony (including
that of another child), physical evidence, a confession, or any clear evidence that
the child has been the victim of sexual abuse, including psychiatric testimony
that the child displays behavioral symptoms of having been sexually abused.
Id.
It is simply too easy to find a psychologist or psychiatrist who is willing to testify that
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child or the defendant should be considered as the type of corrobo-
rative evidence of the existence of the act of sexual contact de-
scribed in the hearsay statement required by the rule. Alice's
mother claims that Alice, relatively near the time of the event, vol-
unteered the statement describing the sexual contact. Alice's
mother's testimony at trial, if believed, supports a finding of
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Alice's
statement described sexual contact which a girl of four probably
would not realize could be enjoyable to an adult male. In addition,
her statement may have disclosed events embarassing to her. It is
difficult to say under* the circumstances, however, that Alice's
statement was a cry for help. Assume no apparent motive to fabri-
cate on the part of Alice or her mother is disclosed during cross-
examination. The question thus posed is whether a criminal defen-
dant can be convicted of the serious crime of child sexual abuse
solely on the basis of an out of court declaration of an unavailable
child? Due process demands a "No" answer.
One may assert that the concern with convicting an accused
solely on the basis of an out of court statement is a question of
sufficiency of evidence and not one of admissibility. While true in
theory, in light of the current hysteria over the recent revelation of
the extent of child sexual abuse, courts and juries may very well be
too ready to convict, if given the opportunity. The requirement of
adequate corroborative evidence thus serves an appropriate screen-
ing function."e The undue tendency to convict is likely to be exac-
erbated by the emerging practice of permitting expert witnesses to
the child displays behavioral symptoms consistent with sexual abuse. The "venality" of ex-
pert witnesses is well documented. See Graham, Impeaching the Professional Expert Wit-
ness by a Showing of Financial Interest, 53 IND. L.J. 35 (1977).
91. See Comment, supra note 88, at 820:
Creating a general exception to the hearsay rule for the statements of chil-
dren in sex abuse cases would render a separate requirement of corroboration
superfluous. But such a step would place the defendant in the untenable posi-
tion of having to refute, without the benefit of cross examination, statements
charged with powerful emotional appeal yet supported only by questionable
common sense suppositions. Moreover, the presumption that children's reports
of sex abuse are inherently reliable will become increasingly less valid as chil-
dren are more commonly instructed on the nature of sex abuse, advised to "tell"
if it happens, and assured that if they tell they will be believed. The public's
heightened awareness of child sex abuse may also lead worried parents to ques-
tion children about their relationships with adults and to misconstrue innocuous
replies. Because the state's case will typically rest largely on the child's hearsay
statement, a general requirement of corroboration is a necessary safeguard
against wrongful conviction.
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testify for the prosecution in support of the child's testimony. In
addition, the corroboration requirement assists prosecutors to dis-
miss cases that should never have been brought, by providing a
way to explain the dismissal to interested individuals.
To highlight the concern over testimony of expert witnesses,
assume that Alice is examined by a psychologist six days after the
incident. She gives the psychologist the same account of the story
that she previously gave to her mother, the doctor, and the police
officer. At trial, however, Alice testifies that Sam never touched her
genital area. She further testifies that she was confused by every-
one's questions and just wanted to tell them what they seemed to
want to hear. She also says that she did not know it would get Sam
into so much trouble. The prosecution now seeks to buttress its
case through expert testimony. The prosecution calls a consulting
psychologist, who never examined Alice, to testify that the delay in
reporting the incident was normal and common for children that
have been sexually abused by a person who lives in the same
household as the child. Another psychologist, who did examine her,
then testifies that, in his opinion, Alice exhibited the classic indica-
tors of child sexual abuse syndrome and that the children who ex-
hibit such a syndrome make truthful out of court statements
describing the sexual contact. Moreover, the expert testifies that
on the basis of his examination of Alice, he is of the opinion that
Alice was sexually abused 92 and that her out of court statements
are truthful. Finally, the expert testifies that young children gener-
ally do not lie about graphic portrayals of sexual activity. Next, a
third psychologist, who also never examined Alice, testifies that re-
cantation is extremely common in sexual abuse cases involving per-
sons that live together. This expert offers his opinion that children
often have guilt feelings concerning the family disruption caused
by his or her complaint. He also testifies that on other occasions,
children have simply been pressured to recant. The expert thus be-
comes a third voice telling the jury that it should believe the
92. One may question the helpfulness of the testimony of an expert witness who testi-
fies at trial. In State v. Lairby, a pediatrician testified:
I'm saying my experience, my experience after seeing children who have
been sexually abused is that children whose behavior, and that includes vocabu-
lary and way of expressing things in terms of their genital area, when the behav-
ior is beyond that which would be acceptable as normal, if you will, in a sexual
sense in a given age group, then that has-yes, that has to influence a concern. It
is one of the indicators of sexual abuse.
699 P.2d 1187, 1201 (Utah 1984).
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child's earlier accusation.' 3 Although court authorization of such
expert testimony is not yet widespread and three separate experts
would rarely be permitted to testify for the prosecution in the
same case,' 4 the testimony of just one expert could constitute an
overwhelming appeal to the jury to follow their own inclinations
and convict.9 The potential for misuse of expert witnesses in the
foregoing manner supports the imposition of a requirement of ade-
quate corroborative evidence with respect to hearsay statements of
an unavailable child declarant as well as to prior inconsistant
statements of a testifying child complainant.
93. For a full discussion of the use of expert witnesses in child sex abuse cases, see Roe,
infra p. 97 (Expert Testimony In Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. Rzv. 97
(1985)). See also State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 654 P.2d 1330 (1982); State v. Middleton, 294
Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983). See generally Wells, Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome: Expert
Testimony-To Admit or Not to Admit, 57 FLA. B.J. 672, 675 (1983)..
94. For a discussion of the limits of social science research, see McCleskey v. Kemp, 753
F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985):
To some extent a broad issue before this Court concerns the role that social
science is to have in judicial decisionmaking. Social science is a broadbased field
consisting of many specialized discipline areas, such as psychology, anthropol-
ogy, economics, political science, history and sociology.... Research consisting
of parametric and nonparametric measures is conducted under both laboratory
controlled situations and uncontrolled conditions, such as real life observational
situations, throughout the disciplines. The broad objectives for social science re-
search are to better understand mankind and its institutions in order to more
effectively plan, predict, modify and enhance society's and the individual's cir-
cumstances. Social science as a nonexact science is always mindful that its re-
search is dealing with highly complex behavioral patterns and institutions that
exist in a highly technical society. At best, this research "models" and "reflects"
society and provides society with trends and information for broad-based gener-
alizations. The researcher's intent is to use the conclusions from research to pre-
dict, plan, describe, explain, understand or modify. To utilize conclusions from
such research to explain the specific intent of a specific behavioral situation goes
beyond the legitimate uses for such research. Even when this research is at a
high level of exactness, in design and results, social scientists readily admit their
steadfast hesitancies to conclude such results can explain specific behavioral ac-
tions in a certain situation.
The judiciary is aware of the potential limitations inherent in such research:
(1) the imprecise nature of the discipline; (2) the potential inaccuracies in
presented data; (3) the potential bias of the researcher, (4) the inherent
problems with the methodology; (5) the specialized training needed to assess and
utilize the data competently, and (6) the debatability of the appropriateness for
courts to use empirical evidence in decisionmaking.
Id. at 887.
95. If the prosecution offers the testimony of expert witnesses, the accused may seek an
order requiring the child to submit to a psychological or psychiatric examination by an ex-
pert that he or she selects. See State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984).
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III. CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION, VIDEOTAPED STATEMENTS,
VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITIONS, AND CHILDREN'S COURTROOMS
Videotaping may be employed to preserve any statement
made or testimony given by a child. If the statement of the child is
admissible pursuant to any hearsay exception, including a special
hearsay exception for statements that describe an act of sexual
contact, the videotape, once authenticated, serves as an alternative
means of introduction of the child's statement into evidence. Thus,
instead of the jury observing the child or another witness testify to
what the child said or having a transcript read, the videotape of
the child speaking can be shown to the jury. The videotape may
be, for example, of a statement made to the child's doctor admit-
ted under Rule 803(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, or of a
videotape of prior testimony at a preliminary hearing admitted
upon a finding of the child's unavailability at trial under Rule
804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Videotaping to preserve and introduce admissible hearsay
statements or testimony of child declarants is not controversial."
Two widely advanced suggestions that involve the use of closed cir-
cuit television, a children's courtroom, videotaped statements, or
videotaped testimony are, however, extremely controversial. The
first suggestion involves altering procedures now associated with
the admission of former testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(1), in litigation involving sexual abuse. The second sugges-
tion involves changing the configuration of trial testimony when
the child actually testifies. Both suggestions represent attempts to
respond to the perceived need to permit children to present their
version of the events without face to face confrontation with the
defendant. The underlying premise is that the child will suffer se-
vere trauma or emotional distress if he or she is called to testify in
the presence of the accused in the traditional trial setting. Advo-
cates argue that it is both advisable and constitutional to avoid live
face to face confrontation between the accused and the child by
means of closed circuit television, a children's courtroom, a video-
taped statement, or videotaped testimony. In addition, advocates
of videotaping in advance of trial argue that the procedure reduces
the number of times the child must repeat the story, thus further
reducing the adverse impact on the child.
The constitutionality and propriety of eliminating the tradi-
tional face to face confrontation between accuser and accused var-
96. See McCoRMICK, supra note 15, § 214 at 675.
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ies depending upon the particular procedure suggested. The use of
closed circuit television and videotaping in child sexual abuse cases
may also raise consitituional questions related to freedom of the
press 97 and public trial concerns."6 These matters are not linked to
the confrontation clause, and will not be addressed in this article.
A. Available Child
As discussed earlier, in Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court
interpreted the confrontation clause to require the production at
trial of the complaining witness, when available, in order to admit
the witness' out of court statement." The right of the defendant to
confront available complaining witnesses stems from the trial of
Sir Walter Raleigh.1" Sir Walter Raleigh was convicted of treason
after a trial by affidavit, without ever being able to confront his
accusers. Not only did the government fail to produce live wit-
nesses, Sir Walter Raleigh was not permitted to summon witnesses
on his own behalf. To remedy this situation, our founding fathers
gave us the confrontation clause and the compulsory process clause
of the sixth amendment: "the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . ."101
1. EX PARTE VIDEOTAPED STATEMENTS
In an attempt to relieve the trauma or emotional distress that
a child witness faces when he or she testifies face to face with the
accused in open court, Texas enacted a statute, Article 38.071(2),
that provides for ex parte videotaping of the child victim's state-
ment and for admissibility of such videotaped statements in open
97. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Morphonios, 467 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 3d DCA
1985).
98. Another area of importance not explored in this article involves enhanced control
by the trial judge over the examination of the child to decrease the stress of testifying.
Suggestions have been made that include: providing a support person for the child, removal
of the judge's robes, and asking the child to testify from a table in the well of the court,
rather than from the witness stand. It is crucially important to avoid unnecessary delays in
the commencement of the trial and unnecessary delays during the testimony of the child so
that the child will be on the witness stand no longer than absolutely necessary. In monitor-
ing cross-examination by defense counsel, the court must keep in mind that children are less
capable than adults when testifying to time and place sequences or small details.
99. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
100. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Ra-
leigh Loses Another, 8 Citm. L. BULL. 99 (1972).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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court provided that "the child is available to testify":
Sec. 2 (a) The recording of an oral statement of the child made
before the proceeding begins is admissible into evidence if:
(1) no attorney for either party was present when the state-
ment was made;
(2) the recording is both visual and aural and is recorded on
film or videotape or by other electronic means;
(3) the recording equipment was capable of making an accu-
rate recording, the operator of the equipment was competent,
and the recording is accurate and has not been altered;
(4) the statement was not made in response to questioning
calculated to lead the child to make a particular statement;
(5) every voice on the recording is identified;
(6) the person conducting the interview of the child in the
recording is present at the proceeding and available to testify or
be cross-examined by either party;
(7) the defendant or the attorney for the defendant is af-
forded an opportunity to view the recording before it is offered
into evidence; and
(8) the child is available to testify.
(b) If the electronic recording of the oral statement of a
child is admitted into evidence under this section, either party
may call the child to testify, and the opposing party may cross-
examine the child. 10 2
Notice that the prosecution need not call the child at any time
during its case in chief in order for the ex parte statement of the
child to be admissible. All that is required is that the child be
made available for the accused to call and examine, and presuma-
bly cross-examine, although subsection (b) seems to indicate other-
wise, if he chooses to do so. The Texas statute is apparently based
upon the notion that as long as the declarant of a hearsay state-
ment is available to be called by the accused and examined at trial,
the right of confrontation is satisfied.
The Texas statute raises many concerns, the most important
of which is its probable unconstitutionality under the confronta-
tion clause.' 03 The only reason we lack a United States Supreme
Court decision squarely on point declaring the procedures provided
in the statute a violation of the confrontation clause is the simple
fact that no one has previously been bold enough to pursue the
102. TIx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071(2) (Vernon 1985).
103. In Long v. State, the court held that Tzx. CRIM. PRoc. CODS ANN. art. 38.071(2)
(Vernon 1985) was unconstitutional. 694 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. CL App. 1985). Contra Tolbert v.
State, 697 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
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statute's approach in the face of the history of the clause, its lan-
guage, and the Supreme Court decisions touching on the subject.
After the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, the public reacted
against the exact abuse that the Texas statute seeks to reim-
pose-trial by ex parte affidavit. The confrontation clause requires
that an available complaining witness be called and examined by
the prosecution in open court, and that he be subjected to cross-
examination by the accused. The compulsory process clause gives
the accused the right to present evidence in his favor; its purpose
is not to permit the accused to present and examine witnesses
against him, which is the apparent intent of the Texas statute. The
language of the sixth amendment makes this perfectly clear: Con-
frontation Clause: "The accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witness against him."' 04 The clause is "to be
confronted with," which requires presentation of evidence by the
prosecution. The clause does not merely say "to confront" which
could more easily be interpreted to mean cross-examination only.
Compulsory Process Clause: "To have compulsory process for ob-
taining witnesses in his favor."' 0' 6 The clause is "witnesses in his
favor" which means witnesses tending to establish his innocence.
The clause does not state "witnesses against him" as apparently
contemplated by the Texas statute.
The Supreme Court decisions which bear upon this point are
in full accord. In Mattox v. United States,'" decided in 1895, the
court said:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in ques-
tion was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as
were sometimes admitted in civil case, [from] being used against
the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-exami-
nation of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity,
not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of
the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the
jury in order that they look at him, and judge by his demeanor
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.'*
In 1899, the Court again considered the right of confrontation.
In Kirby v. United States,'" the Court said:
104. U.S. CoNs'r. amend. VI.
105. Id.
106. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
107. Id. at 24243.
108. 174 U.S. 47 (1890).
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The record showing the result of the trial of the principal
felons was undoubtedly evidence, as against them, in respect of
every fact essential to show their guilt. But a fact which can be
primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved against
an accused, charged with a different offense, for which he may
be convicted without reference to the principal offender, except
by witnesses who confront him at the trial upon whom he can
look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine,
and whose testimony he may impeach in every mode authorized
by the established rules governing the trial or conduct of crimi-
nal cases.109
Over the years, the Supreme Court has decided many cases
involving questions of unavailability of the declarant and admissi-
bility of hearsay statements of unavailable declarants. Roberts rep-
resents the latest of this long line of decisions. In every decision,
the Supreme Court has implicitly premised its discussion upon the
firm principle that the confrontation clause requires available com-
plaining witnesses to be called at trial before the trier of fact for
examination by the prosecution in the presence of the accused, and
to be presented to the defendant for cross-examination. In this
long line of decisions, there is not even the slightest hint that the
sixth amendment permits the prosecution to introduce an ex parte
affidavit merely because the complaining witness is available to be
called and examined by the accused at trial.
In light of the foregoing discussion of the Texas statute and
the assessment of the unconstitutionality of the admissibility of ex
parte videotape statements at trial, other concerns arising from the
statute will be addressed only in passing. 110 First, it is difficult to
see how the Texas statute serves to reduce trauma or emotional
distress from face to face confrontation if the accused exercises his
109. Id. at 55. Accord Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911).
110. Videotaped statements of child victims serve useful functions even if they are not
admitted at trial. Some of these functions are: (1) encouraging confessions and admissions
when shown to the accused; (2) encouraging pleas and agreements to undergo treatment; (3)
reducing the number of interviews with the child; (4) acting as a prior consistent statement;
(5) curtailing recanting; (6) admissibility at preliminary hearing, if hearsay is allowed, or at
the grand jury; (7) preserving the witness' statement and demeanor early in time when
memory is fresh and the threat of outside influence is less than at trial; and (8) employment
by an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 703.
A videotape of the child's statement can also help the court to determine whether the
requisite indicia of reliability are present by permitting it to observe the demeanor of the
child and the degree of suggestiveness of the interviewer. On the other hand, videotape
statements may prove to be inconsistent with subsequent statements or testimony of the
child, thus providing ammunition to the defense.
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right to call the child to the witness stand at trial. Second, the
videotaped statement can be made after the child has been pre-
pared by the prosecution with respect to his or her version of the
critical events-the statute provides only that the prosecuting at-
torney cannot be present at the videotaping session."' Finally,
even if defense counsel decides to run the risk of incurring the
wrath of the jury simply by calling the child to testify, and thereby
exposing the child to the possibility of suffering trauma or emo-
tional distress, it will be extremely difficult for defense counsel to
cross-examine the child with respect to a videotape statement pre-
pared under such circumstances. Not knowing for sure whether the
child at trial, if given the opportunity, would testify in conformity
with the prepared statement creates a serious dilemma for defense
counsel. If defense counsel takes the child through the events once
again, and the child says the same thing, the position of the ac-
cused may be hurt significantly. Is it not suprising that defense
attorneys in Texas rarely call the child to the witness stand. If the
child testifies inconsistently, or claims not to recall, more funda-
mental problems arise. Is the child's videotaped statement still
substantively admissible or is the theory of admissibility limited
solely to prior consistent statements? Under the Roberts confron-
tation clause analysis, the videotaped statement of an unavailable
witness must be ruled inadmissible unless it is shown to possess
sufficient indicia of trustworthiness, Is an unlikely event consider-
ing the surrounding circumstances, including the fact that the
statement was prepared in anticipation of litigation.
2. ABSENCE OF FACE TO FACE CONFRONTATION
Various alternatives have been suggested that would permit
the prosecution to elicit the testimony of a child witness under cir-
cumstances that shield the child from live face to face confronta-
tion with the accused while simultaneously assuring cross-examina-
tion by the attorney for the accused. No showing is required that
the testimony of the child is or would be unavailable at trial.
(a). The Alternatives.
(i). THE CHILDREN'S COURTROOM. A special courtroom could
be built that permits the jury and judge to see the child witness
and the defendant, but would not permit the child witness to see
111. The videotape can thus be equivalent to seeing the final commercial after several
aborted earlier filming attempts.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
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the defendant. The use of one way glass or television monitors
would permit the accused to see the child witness testify. The spe-
cial courtroom may also have other modificiations designed to help
children testify, such as elimination of the imposing judicial bench
and the isolated witness stand.
(ii). CLOSED CIRCUIT TESTIMONY. Another portion of the
Texas statute provides that the testimony of a child may be pro-
jected into the courtroom by means of closed circuit television.'13
The attorneys for the parties, appropriate technicians, and any
person that the child needs to contribute to his or her welfare dur-
ing testimony can accompany the child while he or she testifies.
The judge, jury, and, most importantly, the accused remain in the
courtroom. The child cannot see any of them. Presumably, the de-
fendant would be able to communicate with his attorney during
the examination. A finding by the court of unavailability of the
child to testify in the presence of the accused by reason of trauma
or emotional distress to the child resulting from a face to face con-
frontation is not required. The Texas statute states:
Sec. 3. The court may, on the motion of the attorney of any
party, order that the testimony of the child be taken in a room
other than the courtroom and be televised by closed circuit
equipment in the courtroom to be viewed by the court and the
finder of fact in the proceeding. Only the attorney for the defen-
dant and for the state, persons necessary to operate the equip-
ment, and any person whose presence would contribute to the
welfare and well-being of the child may be present in the room
with the child during his testimony. Only the attorneys may
question the child. The persons operating the equipment shall
be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror
that permits them to see and hear the child during his testi-
mony, but does not permit the child to see or hear them. The
court shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the testi-
mony of the child in person but shall ensure that the child can-
not hear or see the defendant.'1 '
The physical layout can be altered as suggested in Hochheiser v.
Superior Court,' to place the image of the defendant before the
child:
According to the parties, the physical layout will include the
113. TEx. CaiM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071(3) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
114. Id. Section 90.90 of the Florida Statutes employs the same procedures. See infra
note 135.
115. 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
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following: Each of the two minors to be called as a prosecution
witness will testify separately in a small anteroom (probably the
jury room) with the only other persons present in that room be-
ing a parent, as a supporting adult, and the court bailiff. The
judge, jury, defendant, both counsel, the court clerk, court re-
porter and the public (including the press) will be in a separate
courtroom. Both the courtroom and anteroom will have televi-
sion cameras and three television monitors for viewing. The
three television screens and the courtroom will face the judge,
the well in front of counsel table, and the jury box. The three
screens in the anteroom will show the defendant, the trial judge
and the attorney who is examining the witness. Apparently a
single image of the testifying minor and supporting parent will
be televised. The voices of those in the anteroom will simultane-
ously be transmitted as the examination is conducted."'
The Texas statute provides for the attorneys to be in the room
with the child, but in Hochheiser, the attorneys were in the court-
room asking questions over the closed circuit television. The Cali-
fornia legislature has adopted the suggestions made in
Hochheiser.11 7
116. Id. at 788, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279-80.
117. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1985) provides as follows:
(a) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to provide the
court with discretion to employ unusual court procedures to protect the rights of
a child witness, the rights of the defendant, and the integrity of the judicial
process. In exercising its discretion, the court necessarily will be required to bal-
ance the rights of the defendant against the need to protect a child witness and
to preserve the integrity of the court's truthfinding function. This discretion is
intended to be used selectively when the facts and circumstances in the individ-
ual case present compelling evidence of the need to use these unusual
procedures.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court in any criminal
proceeding, upon written notice of the prosecutor made at least three days prior
to the date of the preliminary hearing or trial date on which the testimony of the
minor is scheduled, or during the court of the proceeding on the court's own
motion may order that the testimony of a minor 10 years of age or younger at
the time of the motion be taken by contemporaneous examination and cross-
examination in another place and out of the presence of the judge, jury, defen-
dant, and attorneys, and communicated to the courtroom by means of two-way
closed-circuit television, if the court makes all of the following findings.
(1) The minor's testimony will involve a recitation of the facts of an alleged
sexual offense committed on or with the minor.
(2) The impact on the minor of one or more of the factors enumerated in
subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, is shown by clear and convincing evidence
to be so substantial as to make the minor unavailable as a witness unless closed-
circuit television is used.
(A) Threats of serious bodily injury to be inflicted on the minor or a family
member, of incarceration or deportation of the minor or a family member, or of
19851
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(iii). VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITIONS. An alternative procedure is to
removal of the minor from the family or dissolution of the family, in order to
prevent or dissuade the minor from attending or giving testimony at any trial or
court proceeding or to prevent the minor from reporting the alleged sexual of-
fense or from assisting in criminal prosecution.
(B) Use of a firearm or any other deadly weapon during the commission of
the crime.
(C) Infliction of great bodily injury upon the victim during the commission
of the crime.
(D) Conduct on the part of the defendant or defense counsel during the
hearing or trial which causes the minor to be unable to continue his or her
testimony.
In making the determination required by this section, the court shall con-
sider the age of the minor, the relationship between the minor and the defen-
dant or defendants, any handicap or disability of the minor, and the nature of
the acts charged. The minor's refusal to testify shall not alone constitute suffi-
cient evidence that the special procedure described in this section is necessary in
order to obtain the minor's testimony.
(3) The equipment available for use of two-way closed-circuit television
would accurately communicate the image and demeanor of the minor to the
judge, jury, defendant or defendants, and attorneys.
(c) (1) The hearing on a motion brought pursuant to this section shall be
conducted out of the presence of the jury.
(2) Notwithstanding Section 804 of the Evidence Code or any other provi-
sion of law, the court, in determining the merits of the motion, on the ground
that the minor has not testified.
(3) In determining whether the impact of an individual child of one or more
of the four factors enumerated in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) is so substan-
tial that the minor is unavailable as a witness unless closed-circuit television is
used, the court may question the minor in chambers, or at some other comforta-
ble place other than the courtroom, on the record for a reasonable period of time
with the support person, the prosecutor, and defense counsel present. The de-
fendant or defendants shall not be present. The court shall conduct the ques-
tioning of the minor and shall not permit the prosecutor or defense counsel to
examine the minor. The prosecutor and defense counsel shall be permitted to
submit proposed questions to the court prior to the session in chambers. Defense
counsel shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with the defendant
or defendants prior to the conclusion of the session in chambers.
(d) When the court orders the testimony of a minor to be taken in another
place outside of the courtroom, the court shall do all of the following-
(1) Make a brief statement on the record, outside of the presence of the
jury, of the reasons in support of its order. While the statement need not include
traditional findings of fact, the reasons shall be set forth with sufficient specific-
ity to permit meaningful review and to demonstrate that discretion was exer-
cised in a creful, reasonable, and equitable manner.
(2) Instruct the members of the jury that they are to draw no inferences
from the use of two-way closed-circuit television as a means of facilitating the
testimony of the minor.
(3) Instruct respective counsel, outside of the presence of the jury, that they
are to make no comment during the course of the trial on the use of two-way
closed-circuit television procedures.
(4) Instruct the support witness, outside of the presence of the jury, that he
or she is not to coach, cue or in any way influence or attempt to influence the
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videotape the testimony of the child witness in advance of trial.
This allows the child to testify, subject to cross-examination,
outside the presence of the accused. The accused, of course, would
be in contact with his attorney at all times. The videotape of the
deposition, possibly including pictures of the defendant, would be
shown at trial. The child would not be required to testify at trial.
The Texas statute provides as follows:
testimony of the minor.
(5) Order that a complete record of the examination of the minor, including
the images and voices of all persons who in any way participate in the examina-
tion be made and preserved on video tape in addition to being stenographically
recorded. The video tape shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court in which
the action is pending and shall be made available for viewing to the prosecuting
attorney, the defendant, and his or her attorney during ordinary business hours.
The videotape shall be destroyed after five years have elapsed from the date of
entry of judgment. If an appeal is filed, the tape shall not be destroyed until a
final judgment on appeal has been ordered. Any videotape which is taken pursu-
ant to this section is subject to a protective order of the court for the purpose of
protecting the privacy of the witness. This subdivision does not affect the provi-
sions of subdivision (b) of Section 868.7.
(e) When the court orders the testimony of a minor to be taken in another
place outside the courtroom only the minor, a support person designated pursu-
ant to Section 868.5 of the Penal Code, a nonuniformed bailiff, and, after consul-
tation with the prosecution and the defense, a representative appointed by the
court, shall be physically present for the testimony. A videotape shall record the
image of the minor and his or her testimony, and a separate videotape shall
record the image of the support person.
(f) When the court orders the testimony of a minor to be taken in another
place outside the courtroom, the minor shall be brought into the judge's cham-
bers prior to the taking of his or her testimony to meet for a reasonable period of
time with the judge, the prosecutor and defense counsel. A support person for
the minor shall also be present. This meeting shall be for the purpose of explain-
ing the court process to the child and to allow the attorneys an opportunity to
establish rapport with the child to facilitate later questioning by closed-circuit
television. No participant shall discuss the defendant or any of the facts of the
case with the minor during this meeting.
(g) When the court orders the testimony of a minor to be taken in another
place outside the courtroom, nothing in this section shall prohibit the court from
ordering the minor to be brought into the courtroom for a limited purpose in-
cluding identification of the defendant or defendants as the court deems
necessary.
(h) The examination shall be under oath, and the defendant's image shall be
trasmitted live to the witness via two-way contemporaneous closed-circuit
television.
(i) Nothing in this section shall affect the disqualification of witnesses pur-
suant to Section 701 of the Evidence Code.
0) Judicial Council shall submit a report to the Legislature on or before
January 1, 1988, summarizing the experience of courts which have used contem-
poraneous closed-circuit television pursuant to this section
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Sec. 4. The court may on the motion of the attorney for any
party order that the testimony of the child be taken outside the
courtroom and be recorded for showing in the courtroom before
the court and the finder of fact in the proceeding. Only those
persons permitted to be present at the taking of testimony
under Section 3 of this article may be present during the taking
of the child's testimony, and the persons operating the equip-
ment shall be confined from the child's sight and hearing as pro-
vided by Section 3. The court shall permit the defendant to ob-
serve and hear the testimony of the child in person, but shall
ensure that the child cannot hear or see the defendant. The
court shall also ensure that:
(1) the recording is both visual and aural and is recorded on
film or videotape or by other electronic means;
(2) the recording equipment was capable of making an accu-
rate recording, the operator was competent, and the recording is
accurate and is not altered;
(3) each voice on the recording is identified; and
(4) each party is afforded an opportunity to view the record-
ing before it is shown in the courtroom.
Sec. 5. If the court orders the testimony of a child to be
taken under Section 3 or 4 of this article, the child may not be
required to testify in court at the proceeding for which the testi-
mony was taken."'
(b). Evaluation. If the parties use a children's courtroom,
there will be no face to face confrontation between the accuser and
the accused. The use of closed circuit television or videotaping of
the child's deposition raises additional questions of distortion, ex-
clusion of evidence, and status conferral variations in credibility.
All three procedures raise further concern about the possibility
that the jury will be swayed by the circumstances that required
such a drastic change in procedure, thereby affecting the presump-
tion of innocence.
(i). FACE TO FACE CONFRONTATION. In United States v. Ben-
field,"9 the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a live
face to face meeting is part of the right of confrontation guaran-
teed by the sixth amendment. Benfield involved the admissibility
of a videotaped deposition. The accused was not only excluded
from the deposition room itself, the witness apparently was not ad-
118. TEx. CRIM. PROC. COD ANN. § 38.071(4) (Vernon Supp. 1985). With respect to the
constitutionality of the statute, see infra note 127.
119. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 40:19
INDICIA OF RELIABILITY
vised that the accused was in the building and in communication
with his attorney. Relying on Mattox v. United States,20 Kirby v.
United States,'2 DowdeU v. United States,"2 and Snyder v. Mas-
sachusetts,"'3 the Eighth Circuit concluded that the accused's right
was abridged:
After carefully considering the sixth amendment, applicable
case law, and this record, we are satisfied that the rights of Ben-
field were abridged by the above procedure. Normally the right
of confrontation includes a face-to-face meeting at trial at which
time cross-examination takes place. Mattox, Kirby, Dowdell and
Snyder,... all support that view. While some recent cases use
other language, none denies that confrontation required a face-
to-face meeting in 1791 and none lessens the force of the sixth
amendment. Of course, confrontation requires cross-examination
in addition to a face-to-face meeting .... The right of cross-ex-
amination reinforces the importance of physical confrontation.
Most believe that in some undefined but real way recollection,
veracity, and communication are influenced by face-to-face chal-
lenge. This feature is a part of the sixth amendment right addi-
tional to the right of cold, logical cross-examination by one's
counsel. While a deposition necessarily eliminates a face-to-face
meeting between witness and jury, we find no justification for
further abridgment of the defendant's rights. A videotaped dep-
osition supplies an environment substantially comparable to a
trial, but where the defendant was not permitted to be an active
participant in the video deposition, this procedural substitute is
constitutionally infirm.'"
Hochheiser v. Superior Court is in accord:
It would appear from a careful reading of the cases that
physical confrontation is an element of Sixth Amendment guar-
antees. For example, the Mattox court stated: [T]he primary ob-
ject of the [Confrontation Clause] . . . was to prevent deposi-
tions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner
in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of
testing the recollection of sifting the conscience of the witness,
but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in or-
der that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon
120. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
121. 174 U.S. 47 (1890).
122. 221 U.S. 325 (1911).
123. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
124. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
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the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief. "
As Benfield and Hochheiser indicate, our adversary system, as
reflected in the confrontation clause, rests upon the assumption
that a face to face challenge influences recollection, veracity, and
communication, and that observing this confrontation will assist
the trier of fact in determining credibility. " Our day to day expe-
rience in life indicates that these assumptions are valid. People are
more careful and sincere when they accuse someone face to face
than they are when spreading a rumor. In short, it is unconstitu-
tional to deny a criminal defendant face to face confrontation with
a child witness who is not "unavailable" to testify in the accused's
presence at trial."17
(ii). EFFECT OF CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION AND VIDEOTAPED
DEPOSITIONS. Hochheiser addressed the problems associated with
the use of closed circuit television or videotaped depositions to
present testimony of child witnesses:
Moreover, there are serious questions about the effects on
the jury of using closed-circuit television to present the testi-
mony of an absent witness since the camera becomes the juror's
eyes, selecting and commenting upon what is seen .... [T]here
may be significant differences between testimony by closed-cir-
cuit television and testimony face-to-face with the jury because
of distortion and exclusion of evidence .... For example, "the
lens or camera angle chosen can make a witness look small and
125. 161 Cal. App. 3d at 786, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278. Hochheiser was decided before
passage of Section 1374 of the California Penal Code, which provides for the use of closed
circuit television upon a finding of unavailability. See supra note 117 (text of CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1374).
126. See Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821; Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 777, 208 Cal. Rptr.
at 273.
127. The Supreme Court's most recent opinion relating to an accused's right to physi-
cally confront witnesses against him is United States v. Gagnon, 105 S. Ct. 1482 (1985). In
Gagnon, the Court said:
The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large extent in the Confronta-
tion Clause of the Sixth Amendment ... but we have recognized that this right
is protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the defendant
is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him. In Snyder v. Mas-
sachusetts. . . the Court explained that a defendant has a due process right to
be present at a proceeding whenever h's presence has a relation, reasonably sub-
stantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge ....
"IT]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a
fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.
. .The Court also cautioned in Snyder that the exclusion of a defendant from
a trial proceeding should be considered in light of the whole record.
Id. at 1484.
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weak or large and strong. Lighting can alter demeanor in a num-
ber of ways, . . ." Variations in lens or angle, may result in fail-
ure to convey subtle nuances, including changes in witness de-
meanor. ... [A]nd off-camera evidence is necessarily excluded
while the focus is on another part of the body. . . .Thus, such
use of closed circuit television may affect the jurors' impressions
of the witness' demeanor and credibility . . . .Also it is quite
conceivable that the credibility of a witness whose testimony is
presented via closed-circuit television may be enhanced by the
phenomenon called status-conferral; it is recognized that the
media bestows prestige and enhances the authority of an indi-
vidual by legitimizing his status. . . .Such considerations are of
particular importance when, as here, the demeanor and credibil-
ity of the witness are crucial to the state's case.1 '
While it can be argued with some force that testimony
presented via closed circuit television or videotape is less persua-
sive than live testimony, in the average case, the possibility of en-
hancement of credibility nevertheless certainly exists.
(iii). PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. Whenever litigants use an
alternative to face to face confrontation, there is a risk that the
jury will give weight to the alternative procedure itself in deciding
guilt or innocence. What will a jury think about the child testifying
outside of the physical presence of the accused? Why is the defen-
dant shielded in open court from the child? Why is the defendant
in the courtroom and the child testifying live on closed circuit tele-
vision? Even with respect to the videotaped deposition, where the
absence of face to face confrontation between the child and defen-
dant is less likely to be perceived by the jury, isn't the jury likely
to draw certain inferences from the variation from normal court-
room procedure? Is it possible to draft a jury instruction that in
practice actually will discourage the jury from drawing this infer-
ence? Is a simple instruction to draw no inference from the fact
the child is not testifying in the normal manner likely to be effec-
tive? Should we instead tell the jury that the unfamiliar public set-
ting makes it impossible for the child to appear before them, even
though the primary reason is that the child does not want to face
the accused? If the jury does conclude that the reason the child is
not testifying live before them is to avoid looking at the accused
while testifying, isn't the jury from that fact alone likely to infer
guilt? The Hochheiser court stated: "[T]he presentation of a wit-
ness' testimony via closed-circuit television may affect the pre-
128. 161 Cal. App. 3d at 786, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278-79.
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sumption of innocence by creating prejudice in the minds of the
jurors towards the defendant similar to that created by the use of
physical restraints on a defendant in the jury's presence.' ' 2
(c). Summary. With respect to use of a child's courtroom,
closed circuit television, or videotaped deposition to elicit the testi-
mony of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse, the absence of live
face to face confrontation between the defendant and a child wit-
ness who has not been shown to be unavailable to testify in the
accused's presence violates the defendant's sixth amendment right
to confront witnesses against him.
B. Unavailable Child
Having determined that the confrontation clause demands live
face to face confrontation in open court between the accused and a
child witness who is available to give viva voce testimony at trial, it
is time to address two very difficult questions. First, what circum-
stances, including potential trauma or emotional distress to a par-
ticular child that might arise from face to face confrontation with
the accused in open court, render the child's testimony unavaila-
ble? Second, if the child's testimony is unavailable for any reason,
does presentation in court of the child's testimony, elicited outside
the accused's physical presence, but subject to cross-examination
by counsel for the accused, satisfy the accused's sixth amendment
right to confront witnesses against him?
1. UNAVAILABILITY OF TESTIMONY
A witness' testimony may be unavailable at trial for many
reasons.
(a). Competency. Every witness, including a child witness,
must be competent before he or she will be permitted to testify.
Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence eliminates all grounds
of witness incompetency with respect to a charge, claim, or defense
as to which federal law provides the rule of decision, except those
specifically recognized in the Federal Rules of Evidence. The fol-
lowing characteristics are not grounds of incompetency: age, reli-
gious belief, mental incapacity, color of skin, moral incapacity, con-
viction of a crime, marital relationship, and connection with the
litigation as a party, attorney, or interested person.'" Such mat-
129. Id. at 788, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
130. See FED. R. Evm. 601 advisory committee note.
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ters, long ago regarded as grounds of incompetency, survive today,
in most instances, as avenues of impeachment of the witness. Over-
all, Rule 601 closely reflects the common law.
The only general competency requirements specified in the
Federal Rules of Evidence are contained in Rule 603, which re-
quires that every witness declare that he will testify truthfully by
oath or affirmation, and Rule 602, which requires that the witness
possess personal knowledge. Together these rules require that: (1)
the witness have the capacity to accurately perceive, record and
recollect impressions of facts (physical and mental capacity); (2)
the witness in fact did perceive, record and can recollect impres-
sions having any tendency to establish a fact of consequence in the
litigation (personal knowledge); (3) the witness declare that he or
she will tell the truth and be capable of understanding the duty to
tell the truth (oath or affirmation), which requires that the witness
be capable of distinguishing between the truth and a lie or fan-
tasy;13 1 and (4) the witness possess the capacity to comprehend
questions and express himself understandably, where necessary
with aid of an interpreter under Rule 604 (narration).' Accord-
ingly, Rule 602 requires that before the court permits a witness to
testify, the proferring attorney must introduce evidence sufficient
to support a finding of personal knowledge. Personal knowledge
131. Recommendations have been made to permit a child to testify without taking an
oath or giving an affirmation that he or she will testify truthfully. See FED. R. EVID. 603.
The apparent purpose of the recommendation is to avoid a judicial determination of
whether the child knows the difference between the truth and a lie or fantasy. Query:
Should a witness who does not understand the difference between the truth and a lie or
fantasy or the obligation to tell the truth be permitted to testify? A "No" answer is
suggested.
See F A. STAT. 1 90.605(2) (Supp. 1985). Section 90.605(2) of the Florida Statutes says:
"In the court's discretion, a child may testify without taking the oath if the court deter-
mines the child understands the duty to tell the truth, or the child understands the duty not
to lie." If the child understands the duty to tell the truth, the child can most certainly take
an oath or give an affirmation. Moreover, the court has to decide whether the child knows
the difference between the truth and a lie as part of the process of determining whether the
child understands the duty to tell the truth or not to lie. The wisdom of the Florida statute
is subject to challenge.
132. See Fzn. R EvIv. 604. See also FLA. STAT. § 90.606(1) (Supp. 1985):
When a judge determines that a witness cannot hear or understand the English
language, or cannot express himself in English sufficiently to be understood, an
interpreter who is duly qualified to interpret for the witness shall be sworn to do
so. This section is not limited to persons who speak a language other than Eng-
lish, but applies also to the language and descriptions of any person who cannot
be reasonably understood, or understand questioning, without the aid of an in-
terpreter, such as children or persons who are mentally or developmentally
disabled.
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means that the witness had the capacity to and actually did ob-
serve, receive, and record, and can recollect and narrate impres-
sions obtained through any of his senses that have a tendency to
establish a fact of consequence. The witness must also declare, by
oath or affirmation, in accordance with Rule 603, that he or she
will testify truthfully. No other personal qualifications of a witness
are required.
No mental qualification is specified. The Advisory Commit-
tee's Note reasons that standards of mental capacity have proved
elusive. Few witnesses were actually disqualified. Moreover, it is
difficult to imagine a witness wholly without mental capacity. Al-
though mental incapacity is not a specified ground of incompe-
tency, if a witness' mental capacity has been seriously questioned,
his testimony may still be excluded under Rule 602 on the grounds
that no reasonable juror could believe that the witness possesses
personal knowledge or, under Rule 603 on the grounds that be-
cause no reasonable juror could believe that the witness under-
stands the difference between the truth and a lie or fantasy and
understands the duty to tell the truth.
Competency of a witness to testify requires a minimum ability
to observe, record, recollect, and recount as well as an understand-
ing of the difference between the truth and a lie or fantasy, and an
understanding of the duty to tell the truth. Where the capacity of
a witness is questioned, the ultimate determination is whether a
reasonable juror must believe that the witness is so bereft of his
powers of observation, recordation, recollection, and narration so
as not to believe the witness possesses personal knowledge of the
event related and told the truth. Such a test of competency has
been characterized as requiring minimum credibility.'"s Courts
133. 3 J. WIUNSTRIN, WEINsTEIN'S EVIDENCR § 6011011 (1981):
In such cases, since there are no longer artificial grounds for disqualifying a wit-
ness as incompetent, the traditional preliminary examination into competency is
no longer required. But a trial judge still has broad discretion to control the
course of a trial (Rule 611) and rule on relevancy (Rules 401 and 403). If compe-
tency is defined as the minimum standard of credibility necessary to permit any
reasonable man to put any credence in a witness's testimony, then a witness
must be competent as to the matters he is expected to testify about; it is the
court's obligation to insure that he meets that minimum standard. In making
this determination the court will still be deciding competency. It would, how-
ever, in view of the way the rule is cast, probably be more accurate to say that
the court will decide not competency but minimum credibility. This requirement
of minimum credibility is just one aspect of the requirement of minimum proba-
tive force - i.e., relevancy. Regardless of terminology, the trial judge may exclude
all or a part of the witness's testimony on the ground that no one could reasons-
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tend to resolve doubts about minimum credibility of a witness, in-
cluding a child witness, in favor of permitting the jury to hear the
testimony and judge the credibility of the witness for itself.
(b). Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a). The testimony of a
competent witness may be unavailable for several reasons includ-
ing any of the reasons set forth in Rule 804(a):
Definition of Unavailability. Unavailability as a witness includes
situations in which the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege
from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement;
[or]
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter
of his statement despite an order of the court to do so; [or]
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his
statement; [or]
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of
death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his state-
ment has been unable to procure his attendance (or in the case
of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2),(3), or (4), his
attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, re-
fusal, claim of lack of memory, inability or absence is due to the
procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement
for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or
testifying.'"
The definition of unavailability contained in Rule 804(a) includes,
but is not limited to, five alternatives, each one sufficient to satisfy
the requirement. The thrust of the alternative definitions of un-
availability is upon the unavailability of the testimony of the wit-
ness which includes, but is not limited to, situations in which the
witness is not physically present in court.
Rule 804(a)(1) provides that a witness is unavailable if he or
bly believe the witness could have observed, remembered, communicated or told
the truth with respect to the event in question. He may use the voir dire to
make this determination .... Thus, the practice can-and probably will-even
in non-state law caes remain much as it has been in determining that the wit-
ness meets minimum credibility standards.
While not embodied directly in the rules, implied through Rules 401 to 403
is Rule 19 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953) [t]hat the Judge may reject
the testimony of a witness that he perceived a matter if he finds that no trier of
fact could reasonably believe that the witness did perceive the matter.
134. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
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she is exempt from testifying about the subject matter of the state-
ment on the grounds of privilege. The witness must make an actual
claim of privilege that is allowed by the court before the witness
will be considered unavailable. Rule 804(a)(2) provides that a wit-
ness is unavailable if he persists in refusing to testify concerning
the subject matter of the statement despite a court order. Silence
resulting from misplaced reliance upon a privilege without making
a claim, or in spite of a court denial of an asserted claim of privi-
lege, constitutes unavailibility under this subsection. Rule
804(a)(3) provides that a witness is unavailable if he testifies to a
lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement. A witness
either may truly lack recollection or may feign lack of recollection
for a variety of reasons, including an unwillingness or inability to
confront the defendant face to face. In either event, the witness is
unavailable to the extent that he asserts lack of recollection of the
subject matter of a prior statement.
Rule 804(a)(4) provides that a witness is unavailable if unable
to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then-
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity. Death is the most
obvious basis; mental illness and physical disability of a serious na-
ture are equally compelling. In criminal matters, if the govern-
ment's witness is only temporarily unavailable, the confrontation
clause may require resort to a continuance. In both civil and crimi-
nal cases, where the testimony of a temporarily unavailable witness
is critical, the trial court should consider carefully the option of
granting a continuance.
Rule 804(a)(5) provides that in both civil and criminal cases, a
declarant is unavailable if his presence cannot be secured by pro-
cess or other reasonable means. In criminal cases, the confronta-
tion clause requires that the government make a good faith effort
to obtain the presence of the witness at trial, going beyond a mere
showing of an inability to compel appearance by subpoena, before
prior testimony may be introduced as a substitute for testimony.
The court must determine on a case to case basis whether the gov-
ernment has shown good faith in attempting to locate and procure
the witness' attendance.
(c). Severe Psychological Injury. Efforts to shield child wit-
nesses from potential injury derived from live face to face confron-
tation at trial requires the establishment of a standard to be ap-
plied to determine when such a child is "unavailable" within the
meaning of the confrontation clause.
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Two Florida Statutes, 90.90(1)135 and 92.54(1),1s each provide
135. Florida deals with the videotaping of child victims' depositions as follows:
Sexual abuse or child abuse case; videotaping of testimony of victim or wit-
ness under age 16.-
(1) On motion and hearing in camera and finding that there is a substantial
likelihood that a victim or witness who is under the age of 16 would suffer at
least moderate emotional or mental harm if he were required to testify in open
court, or that such victim or witness is otherwise unavailable as defined in §
90.804(1), the trial court may order the videotaping of the testimony of the vic-
tim or witness in a sexual abuse case or child abuse case, whether civil or crimi-
nal in nature, which videotaped testimony is to be utilized at trial in lieu of trial
testimony in open court.
(2) The motion may be filed by.
(a) The victim or witness, or the victim's or witness' attorney, parent, legal
guardian, or guardian ad litem;
(b) A trial judge on his own motion;
(c) Any party in a civil proceeding; or
(d) The prosecuting attorney or the defendant, or the defendant's counsel.
(3) The judge shall preside, or shall appoint a special master or preside, at
the videotaping unless the following conditions are met:
(a) The child is represented by a guardian ad litem or counsel;
(b) The representative of the victim or witness and the counsel for each
party stipulate that the requirement for the presence of the judge or special
master may be waived; and
(c) The court finds at a hearing on the motion that the presence of a judge
or special master is not necessary to protect the victim or witness.
(4) The defendant and the defendant's counsel shall be present at the vide-
otaping, unless the defendant has waived this right. The court may require the
defendant to view the testimony from outside the presence of the child by means
of a two-way mirror or another similar method that will ensure that the defen-
dant can observe and hear the testimony of the child in person, but that the
child cannot hear or see the defendant. The defendant and the attorney for the
defendant may communicate by any appropriate private method.
(5) Any party, or the court on its own motion, may request the aid of an
interpreter, as provided in § 90.606, to aid the parties in formulating methods of
questioning the child and in interpreting the answers of the child throughout
proceedings conducted under this section.
(6) The motion referred to in subsection (1) may be made at any time with
reasonable notice to each party to the cause, and videotaping of testimony may
be made any time after the court grants the motion. The videotaped testimony
shall be admissible as evidence in the trial of the cause; however, such testimony
shall not be admissible in any trial or proceeding in which such witness testifies
by use of closed circuit television pursuant to § 92.54.
(7) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record, as to the
basis for its ruling under this section.
FL. STAT. § 90.90 (Supp. 1985).
136. Florida deals with the closed circuit testimony of a child victim of or witness to sex
abuse as follows:
Use of closed circuit television in proceedings involving sexual offenses
against victims under the age of 16. -
(1) Upon motion and hearing in camera, the trial court may order that the
testimony of a child under the age of 16 who is a victim of or witness to an
unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion, penetration or other sexual offense be
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that a child witness is unavailable upon "a finding [by the court]
that there is a substantial likelihood" that a child victim or witness
of sexual abuse "would suffer at least moderate emotional or
mental distress if required to testify in open court. 13 7 A Maine
statute, Title 15, Section 1205, provides that the child witness is
unavailable if the trial court finds "that the emotional or psycho-
logical well being of the person would be substantially impaired if
the person were to testify at trial."18 The New Mexico Rules of
Procedure for the Children's Court, Rule 34.1, provides for un-
availability "upon a showing that the child may be unable to tes-
tify without suffering unreasonable and unnecessary mental or
emotional harm." 3 9 Finally, the California Evidence Code, Section
240, declares that a witness is unavailable on the ground of physi-
cal or mental illness or infirmity when expert testimony "estab-
lishes that physical or mental trauma resulting from an alleged
crime has caused harm to a witness of sufficient severity that the
taken outside of the courtroom and shown by means of closed circuit television,
upon a finding that there is a substantial likelihood that the child will suffer at
least moderate emotional or mental harm if required to testify in open court, or
that such victim or witness is unavailable as defined in § 90.804(1).
(2) The motion may be filed by the victim or witness, his attorney, parent,
legal guardian, or guardian ad litem, the prosecutor, the defendant, or the defen-
dant's counsel; or the trial judge on his own motion.
(3) Only the judge, the prosecutor, the defendant, the attorney for the de-
fendant, the operators of the videotape eouipment, an interpreter, and some
other person who, in the opinion of the court, contributes to the well-being of
the child and who will not be a witness in the case may be in the room during
the recording of the testimony.
(4) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the court may
require the defendant to view the testimony from the courtroom. In such a case,
the court shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the testimony of the
child, but shall ensure that the child cannot hear or see the defendant. The
judge and defendant and the persons in the room where the child is testifying
may communicate by any appropriate electronic method.
(5) The court shall make specific findings of fact on the record, as to the
basis for its ruling under this section.
FLA. STAT. § 92.54 (Supp. 1985).
137. Notice that Fla. Stat. § 90.803(23) (Supp. 1985), creating a hearsay exception for
statements of child victims of sexual abuse provides for unavailibility upon a showing of
substantial likelihood of "severe emontional or mental harm." Requiring only "moderate
emotional or mental distress" in connection with closed circuit television or videotaped dep-
osition in comparison to "severe emotional or mental harm" in connection with a child vic-
tim hearsay exception is probably based upon the mistaken and inappropriate notion that
the confrontation clause requirement of unavailibility can be varied depending upon the
trustworthiness of the testimony being admitted, i.e., the more trustworthy the testimony,
the less strenuous the showing needed to establish unavailibility.
138. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205(1) (Supp. 1984-1985).
139. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-34.1 (Supp. 1982).
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witness is physically unable to testify or is unable to testify with-
out suffering substantial trauma." An expert witness is defined for
this purpose to include physicians, surgeons, and psychiatrists.14 0
Whether a finding that the child witness would suffer moder-
ate emotional or mental distress, substantial emotional or psycho-
logical impairment, unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emo-
tional harm, or substantial trauma, if required to testify face to
face in open court in the presence of the accused, is sufficient to
constitute unavailability under the confrontation clause is uncer-
tain, but doubtful. A showing of greater likelihood of severe psy-
chological injury is probably required.
Witnesses who testify in open court often suffer some emo-
tional distress. Many, if not most, rape victims suffer severe emo-
tional distress or trauma while testifying, especially when face to
face with the accused. Presumably, so do many other groups of vic-
tims. "Unavailability" requires more than merely showing the pos-
sibility of emotional distress or trauma, even more than showing a
likelihood that such emotional distress or trauma will be substan-
tial or severe. In People v. Stritzinger, s the court held that in
order to find that a witness is unavailable due to emotional distress
or trauma, the potential psychological injury must render the wit-
ness' testimony "relatively impossible."
For a child witness to be found to be unavailable, the court
must decide that the emotional distress or trauma now present or
likely to be suffered by the child witness as a result of live face to
face confrontation in open court with the accused when testifying
as to acts of prohibited sexual contact is significantly more severe
than the emotional distress or trauma often suffered by other wit-
nesses. In determining whether it is "relatively impossible" for the
child witness to testify on the basis of the likelihood of severe psy-
chological injury, Warren v. United States,14 3 suggests looking at
the following factors:
140. CAL. Evm. CODE § 240 (West Supp. 1985).
141. Attorneys and psychologists that were present at a conference on child sexual
abuse unanimously reported that a great majority of children are capable of testifying at
trial without much difficulty. See supra note *. Children who initially volunteered the re-
port of the incident were usually able to repeat their complaint in front of the accused at
trial. Children who had to be questioned about the sexual abuse before disclosing it, and
who fluctuated in their accounts of what transpired, were more likely to suffer trauma and
emotional distress from face to face confrontation in open court. Such children were also
more likely to recant before or at trial.
142. 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1983).
143. 436 A.2d 821 (D.C. App. 1981).
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[Wie think that the following matters are relevant to the ques-
tion of psychological unavailability: (1) the probability of psy-
chological injury as a result of testifying, (2) the degree of antici-
pated injury, (3) the expected duration of the injury, and (4)
whether the expected psychological injury is substantially
greater than the reaction of the average victim of a rape, kid-
napping [child sexual abuse] or terrorist act. Just as in the case
of physical infirmity, it is difficult to state the precise quantum
of evidence required to meet the standard of unavailability. The
factors should be weighed in the context of each other, as well as
in the context of the nature of the crime and the pre-existing
psychological history of the witness.'"
144. Id. at 830. See also Comment, supra note 88, at 819, 824.
Some trauma is inevitable whenever a child takes the stand, and although the
trauma of testifying should be minimized to the extent possible, it cannot justify
depriving the defendant of a fundamental aspect of his right to a fair trial.
... Specifically, the state holds an interest in protecting young children, alleg-
edly the victims of sexual abuse, from the trauma of repeated appearances and
extended testimony in open court in the presence of the alleged assailant. The
trial judge should therefore allow the child to testify on videotape if testifying in
open court would cause the child substantial emotional trauma.
Id.
Compare this view with the view in State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 326 N.W.2d 744
(1982):
The well-accepted legal principle, a fundamental tenet of our modern legal sys-
tem, is that the public has a right to every person's evidence except for those
persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege. This
principle applies to all of us-even to the President of the United States.
The principle and its corollary-that each person has a duty to testify-are be-
sic to the adversary system. The integrity of the legal system depends on the
court's ability to compel full disclosure of all relevant facts under the rules of
evidence. The theory of the adversary system is that examination of all persons
who have relevant information will develop all relevant facts and will lead to
justice.
Nonetheless, our sense of compassion tells us that we should do what we can to
protect a ten-year-old who allegedly has been abused by her mother from further
victimization in a legal system which is committed to protecting human rights.
No sensitive person can read about child abuse without feeling anguish for the
abused child or without understanding a child's needs and wishes to avoid con-
fronting and accusing the alleged abuser in criminal proceedings, especially if
the abuser is a close relative of the child. We commend Attorney Daniel, BP's
guardian ad litem, for impressing upon us the importance of the issue we decide
today and for his continuing concern for BP's well-being and his good counsel.
While we are concerned with the victim-witness child, we must also consider
that although the district attorney's insistence on BP's testifying is portrayed as
being cruel and insensitive, the district attorney is also concerned with BP's wel-
fare. In demanding the testimony the district attorney represents BP's interests
and the public's interest in prosecuting an alleged child abuser and murderer.
The district attorney contends that BP's testimony may be crucial to bringing
the mother to trial. The district attorney faces the dilemma of letting the defen-
dant go free or doing harm to the emotional well-being of the child-victim by
[Vol. 40:19
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Applying the foregoing standard, it is extremely unlikely that
either tha Maine, New Mexico, or California statutes previously
discussed, as currently written, will often come into play. The
Maine statute provides that, upon a finding of unavailability, prior
recorded testimony of the child witness subject to cross-examina-
tion by the accused becomes admissible. The California statute
provides similarly, but only as to preliminary hearing testimony.
New Mexico sanctions the taking and admissibility of videotaped
depositions. Notice, however, that all three statutory schemes pro-
vide that the defendant must be present face to face with the
child, when the testimony of the child is taken."' Only under very
unusual circumstances will the taking of the child's testimony face
to face with the accused in open court be "relatively impossible"
while it is "relatively possible" for the same child to testify face to
face with the defendant at a prior hearing, former trial, prelimi-
nary hearing perpetuation deposition.' 4 '
Unlike the above three statutes, Section 90.90(4) of the Flor-
ida Statutes provides for taking the child's videotaped deposition
compelling her testimony. Were the district attorney to decide not to call the
child as a witness, the district attorney may protect the child's emotional inter-
est in not being forced to face the alleged abuser and accuse the abuser of crimi-
nal acts, but may inflict greater harm on the child by allowing the alleged abuser
to go free and by demonstrating to the child that the state of Wisconsin does not
place a high enough value on the child's suffering to bring to justice the person
alleged to have caused the suffering.
Id. at - 326 N.W.2d at 746-47. The court further stated:-
We can find no precedent, and none has been cited, that a court may completely
excuse a witness from his or her obligation to testify because of the witness's
claim of emotional harm. In cases in which adult witnesses have asked to be
excused from their duty to testify on the grounds of personal fear of reprisal, or
fear for the witness's family's safety, courts have generally been reluctant to ex-
cuse the witness, concluding that the public policy in favor of compelling testi-
mony outweighs the possible harm that testifying would cause. This court has
strictly construed the public policy in favor of having a witness testify when the
witness claims emotional damage. The court refused to allow the use of a deposi-
tion in lieu of live testimony in a criminal case when the argument was made
which would cause him psychiatric illness.
Id. at....., 326 N.W.2d at 749-50.
146. The Maine statute provides that upon a finding of unavailability, prior recorded
testimony of the child subject to cross-examination by the accused becomes admissible. M.
Ray. STAT. Arm. tit. 15, § 1205(1) (Supp. 1984-1985). The California statute has a similar
provision that only deals with preliminary hearing testimony. CAt. Evm. CODE J 240 (Supp.
1985). New Mexico sanctions taking and admitting videotaped depositions. N.M. STAT. ANN.
5 4-34.1 (Supp. 1982).
146. A deposition may be less stressful because it is not public. On the other hand, if
counsel is taking the child's deposition in a small room, and the defendant is there, the child
will have trouble looking away. The process may thus be more traumatic than testimony in
open court.
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testimony outside the physical presence of the accused:
The defendant and the defendant's counsel shall be present at
the videotaping, unless the defendant has waived this right. The
court may require the defendant to view the testimony from
outside the presence of the child by means of a two-way mirror
or another similar method that will ensure that the defendant
can observe and hear the testimony of the child in person, but
that the child cannot hear or see the defendant. The defendant
and the attorney for the defendant may communicate by any
appropriate private method. 47
The Florida statute that provides for the use of closed circuit tele-
vision at trial, Section 92.54(4), is in accord:
During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the
court may require the defendant to view the testimony from the
courtroom. In such a case, the court shall permit the defendant
to observe and hear the testimony of the child, but shall ensure
that the child cannot hear or see the defendant. The judge and
defendant and the persons in the room where the child is testi-
fying may communicate by any appropriate electronic
method. '
(d). Unwillingness or Inability. A child witness may be un-
available because the child is unwilling or unable to testify in open
court, whether or not in the accused's presence, even though re-
quested by the court to do so. On other occasions, a child placed in
the unfamiliar court surroundings simply falls apart and forgets
what happened. In each instance, the child's testimony is
unavailable.14
2. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Let's return to the hypothetical child sexual abuse victim, Al-
ice. Assume that Alice confronted Sam with her accusation. This
may have occurred at the time of her initial statements of com-
plaint or during the investigation of the criminal complaint. As-
147. FLA. STAT. § 90.90(4) (Supp. 1985).
148. Id. at § 92.54(4).
149. See State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17,..-., 647 P.2d 836, 841 (1985) ("The child may be
unable to testify at trial due to fading memory, retraction of earlier statements due to guilt
or fear, tender age, or inability to appreciate the proceedings in which he or she is a partici-
pant."); supra note 88, at 819 ("If, having been called to testify, the child proves too fright-
ened or inarticulate to allow any meaningful examination, then a finding of unavailability
would be justified .... ). Such a witness' testimony is unavailable under Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(a).
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sume further that Alice told the state's attorney or the child psy-
chologist working with her that she will not say that Sam rubbed
her on her genitals if Sam is present. The child psychologist is pre-
pared to say that forcing Alice to testify face to face with Sam in
open court may cause some short term distress, but it is unlikely,
given her age, to be severe or long term. The child psychologist
believes that while the entire incident may have long term reper-
cussions for Alice, it is unlikely that face to face confrontation will
add significantly to these long term effects. Of course, if Alice had
never confronted Sam with her accusation, the likelihood of the
psychologist opining that it is "relatively impossible" for Alice to
testify would increase. Given the lack of clinical hard evidence
about the long range effects of face to face confrontation with the
accused, even if the psychologist were to testify, the court should
declare the child unavailable because of the potential for severe
psychological injury only when the court, upon consideration of all
the evidence, finds by clear and convincing evidence that the crite-
ria set forth constituting "relative impossibility" to testify has
been satisfied.
If the prosecution wants the court to declare Alice unavailable
for face to face confrontation on the basis of potential severe psy-
chological injury that makes her testimony "relatively impossible,"
the court should hold an evidentiary hearing in advance of trial, at
which time the prosecution may, and most likely would offer ex-
pert testimony as to Alice's condition. Alice may or may not be
required to testify. A presumption in favor of requiring Alice to
testify at the hearing outside Sam's presence seems warranted. If
the court finds Alice unavailable, a statute or court rule should
give the prosecution the opportunity to take a videotaped perpetu-
ation deposition employing previously discussed procedures, so
that Alice will not have to come face to face with Sam. The alter-
natives of closed circuit television and employing a children's
courtroom at trial should also be considered.
The court should also require an evidentiary hearing if the
prosecution believes that Alice is or may become unavailable on
the basis of unwillingness or inability to testify in open court with
Sam present. There are several ways in which the court could con-
duct such a hearing. The court could put Alice in the same room as
Sam in advance of trial at a deposition or otherwise, or outside the
jury's presence at trial, in order to see if Alice will actually refuse
to testify at such a dress rehearsal. The court could also rely on
Alice's statement that she will not testify if Sam is present, or on
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the testimony of appropriate experts to that effect."" A dress re-
150. See State v. Melendez, 135 Ariz. 390, 661 P.2d 654 (1983). In this case, the court
used the videotaped testimony of the child victim at trial, because the victim was scared to
testify in front of the jury. A clinical psychologist testified that the child would become
uncommunicative if she were called to testify before a jury. If all courts employ the same
procedure that this court used, unavailability will become too conjectural. But see CAL. Pz-
NAL CODE § 1347(b)-(c) (1985). Under the California statute, it is not easy for the prosecu-
tion to have the court declare the child victim unavailable:
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court in any criminal
proceeding, upon written notice of the prosecutor made at least three days prior
to the date of the preliminary hearing or trial date on which the testimony of the
minor is scheduled, or during the course of the proceeding on the court's own
motion, may order that the testimony of a minor 10 years of age or younger at
the time of the motion be taken by contemporaneous examination and cross-
examination in another place and out of the presence of the judge, jury, defen-
dant, and attorneys, and communicated to the courtroom by means of a two-way
closed circuit televsion, if the court makes all of the following findings:
(1) The minor's testimony will involve a recitation of the facts of an alleged
sexual offense committed on or with the minor.
(2) The impact on the minor of one or more of the factors enumerated in
subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, is shown by clear and convincing evidence
to be so substantial as to make the minor unavailable as a witness unless closed-
circuit television is used.
(A) Threats of serious bodily injury to be inflicted on the minor or a family
member, or incarceration or deportation of the minor or a family member, or of
removal of the minor from the family or dissolution of the family, in order to
prevent or dissuade the minor from attending or giving testimony at any trial or
court proceeding or to prevent the minor from reporting the alleged sexual of-
fense or from assisting in criminal prosecution.
(B) Use of a firearm or any other deadly weapon during the commission of
the crime.
(C) Infliction of great bodily injury upon the victim during the commission
of the crime.
(D) Conduct on the part of the defendant or defense counsel during the
hearing or trial which causes the minor to be unable to continue his or her
testimony.
In making the determination required by this section, the court shall consider
the age of the minor, the relationship between the minor and the defendant or
defendants, any handicap or disability of the minor, and the nature of the acts
charged. The minor's refusal to testify shall not alone constitute sufficient evi-
dence that the special procedure described in this section is necessary in order to
obtain the minor's testimony.
(3) The equipment available for use of two-way closed-circuit television
would accurately communicate thee and demeanor of the minor to the judge,
jury, defendant or defendants, and attorneys.
(c)(1) The hearing on a motion brought pursuant to this section shall be
conducted out of the presence of the jury.
(2) Notwithstanding Section 804 of the Evidence Code or any other provi-
sion of law, the court, in determining the merits of the motion, shall not compel
the minor to testify at the hearing; nor shall the court deny the motion on the
ground that the minor has not testified.
(3) In determining whether the impact on an individual child of one or more
of the four factors enumerated in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) is so substan-
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hearsal to test Alice's actual unwillingness or inability to testify in
Sam's presence will most often be appropriate.
If the court determines that Alice is unavailable on the basis
of unwillingness or inability to testify, shouldn't Sam nevertheless
be entitled to have the prosecutor present Alice in open court
where she can be observed by the jury? In the absence of a pretrial
finding of unavailability based upon "relative impossibility", even
if Alice says nothing when questioned by the prosecution,
shouldn't Sam have the right to confront Alice in open court? Con-
versely, if a pretrial hearing determines that Alice will not testify
meaningfully in open court in Sam's presence, shouldn't Sam have
the right to have the court declare her incompetent to testify and
thus barred from taking the witness stand at all? In short, if Sam
and his attorney believe that the jury will infer that the events
that she described in her videotaped testimony must have occurred
for Alice to be so scared, Sam should have the right to bar Alice's
testimony at trial if a pretrial rehearsal shows her to be unavaila-
ble. On the other hand, if Sam and his attorney do not fear jury
speculation but prefer to let the jury see Alice on the stand, close
up and in person, Sam's right to confront witnesses against him
mandates that the court grant Sam that privilege.
If the prosecution believes that Alice may not be both willing
to testify in court in Sam's presence and able to do so without suf-
fering severe psychological injury, a complimentary procedure
should be considered. The trial court, on motion of the prosecu-
tion, could order a perpetuation deposition. The prosecution could
offer the perpetuation deposition testimony at trial if the parties
later stipulated that Alice was unavailable, if the court later found
that she was unavailable, or if for any reason she proved to be un-
available when called to testify at trial in Sam's presence. Presum-
ably, the prosecution would not request a conditional perpetuation
tial that the minor is unavailable as a witness unless closed-circuit television is
used, the court may question the minor in chambers, or at some other comforta-
ble place other than the courtroom, on the record for a reasonable period of time
with the support person, the prosecutor, and defense counsel present. The de-
fendant or defendants shall not be present. The court shall conduct the ques-
tioning of the minor and shall not permit the prosecutor or defense counsel to
examine the minor. The prosecutor and defense counsel shall be permitted to
submit proposed questions to the court prior to the session in chambers. Defense
counsel shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with the defendant
or defendants prior to the conclusion of the session in chambers.
Id.
Notice that the possibility of severe emotional distress or trauma to the child from face to
face confrontation with the accused is not included in (A)-(D) above.
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deposition order unless it believed that face to face presence in
open court or other circumstances were likely to cause a deteriora-
tion in the child or the child's testimony. The deposition would
obviously create an opportunity for the defendant's lawyer to test
his cross-examination. Moreover, the deposition testimony would
serve to impeach the child if he or she testified inconsistently at
trial. Since the prosecution would naturally desire to avoid both
possibilities, the prosecution would likely request a conditional
perpetuation deposition only when the chances are great that Alice
would deteriorate at trial. Accordingly, the perpetuation deposition
should be available on motion, as a matter of right, without requir-
ing the prosecution to make a specific showing of cause. The mo-
tion procedure is preferable to mere notice because it keeps the
court advised of the circumstances surrounding Alice's testimony
and provides the court an opportunity to participate in the struc-
turing of the procedures to be followed at the videotaped perpetua-
tion deposition.
3. ADMISSIBILITY
(a). Confrontation. Where a court declares a witness unavail-
able at trial for reasons such as lack of recollection, unwillingness
or inability to testify, or likelihood of severe psychological injury,
may a court admit a perpetuation deposition, or other testimony
given subject to cross-examination, without violating the confron-
tation clause, if the defendant was denied live face to face confron-
tation when the testimony was taken? Similarly, may the court or-
der the child to testify on closed circuit television or in a children's
courtroom once it has been determined that the child's viva voce
testimony in court face to face with the accused, is unavailable?
Answer: Almost always, if not always, "Yes."
If Alice is truly unavailable under the standards previously
discussed, then the introduction into evidence of her testimony,
without live face to face confrontation with the defendant at the
perpetuation deposition or other formal hearing in the same pro-
ceeding, is almost always, if not always, permissible under the con-
frontation clause. Under Roberts and the definition of hearsay con-
tained in Rule 801(a)-(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, one
should analyze Alice's testimony as a hearsay statement of an un-
available declarant.'15 This is true even if Alice is testifying via
closed circuit television or live in a child's courtroom-the absence
151. FED. R. EvID. 801(a)-(c).
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of live face to face confrontation with the accused mandates this
result. As a hearsay statement of an unavailable declarant, con-
frontation is satisfied only if Alice's testimony bears adequate indi-
cia of reliability. Pursuant to Roberts, reliability can be inferred
when the hearsay evidence falls within a traditional "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception. If Alice's testimony is admissible pursu-
ant to the proposed special statutory hearsay exception for testi-
mony of a child witness relating an act of sexual contact, it will
possess almost all of the aspects of former testimony admitted
under Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.52 The ab-
sence of live face to face confrontation, however, prevents testi-
mony admitted under a special hearsay exception for testimony
from being considered former testimony. Accordingly, under Rob-
erts, Alice's testimony must be shown to possess particularized cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to that pos-
sessed by hearsay statements that are admissible under the
traditional "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions.
Applying such criteria, a court should find that Alice's testi-
mony satisfies the confrontation clause. Alice is testifying under
oath, subject to full cross-examination. The jury may observe Al-
ice's demeanor either live, by closed circuit television or on video-
tape. The defendant's demeanor could and should be visible to the
trier of fact. Oath, cross-examination and demeanor are strong in-
dicia of reliability. In addition, if Alice will still testify, a television
picture of Sam could be projected for her to view while she testi-
fies. Although it does not constitute physical face to face confron-
tation, this procedure would add another circumstantial guarantee
of trustworthiness to the tesimony, making the procedure almost
indistinguishable in operation from former testimony hearsay
statements admitted under Rule 804(b)(1). Moreover, various
other factors, such as absence of motive to fabricate, non sugges-
tive inquiry, embarrassing event and cry for help, are present with
respect to Alice's testimony. These factors provide additional cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trust- worthiness.
Although it is debatable whether oath, demeanor of the victim
and cross-examination are alone enough to establish equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, a "Yes" answer is
suggested. If such indicia are combined with display to the trier of
fact of the demeanor of the accused and projection of the accused's
image before the child victim during the child's testimony, a "Yes"
152. Id. at 804(b)(1).
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answer is strongly indicated and advisable. Treating these proce-
dures as adequate alone would avoid practical problems associated
with evaluating other indicia of reliability, especially when the
child testifies live over closed circuit television or in a children's
courtroom. If additional indicia of reliability are ultimately re-
quired by the courts, it may be beneficial to hold a pretrial hearing
to determine admissibility. At least some indicia of reliability exist
with respect to the great majority of victim statements describing
prohibited acts of sexual contact performed with or on the child by
another. When combined with oath, demeanor, and cross-examina-
tion, a court will almost always find an adequate particularized
showing of equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness.
(b). Corroboration. If Alice is unavailable for confrontation
clause purposes, should the court, in addition require adequate
corroborative evidence of the act described in her testimony? The
prosecution could call expert witnesses to explain why Alice is un-
willing or unable to testify, or can't or won't recall, and to say that
Alice told the truth during her testimony outside Sam's presence
thus adding to the danger that Alice's testimony will be overvalued
by the jury. Nevertheless, the circumstances of Alice's testimony so
closely parallel viva voce testimony at trial that traditional notions
for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict of
guilty should prevail. Courts should not impose the additional re-
quirement of adequate corroborative evidence of the acts described
in the testimony of the unavailable child witness.
4. SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS
With respect to establishing unavailability, legislatures and
courts should amend current statutes and rules to provide specifi-
cally for unavailability based upon the presence of, or potential for,
severe psychological injury to a child witness if forced to face the
defendant in open court. Supporting commentary should make
clear, however, that the appropriate standard for unavailability is
"relative impossibility" and that the factors set forth in Warren v.
United States should be taken into consideration. 8
The legislatues and courts should also amend their statutes
153. Sometimes the problem is not that the child cannot testify in open court without
suffering severe psychological injury, but that the attorney does not want to try the case for
some reason. It is possible that counsel does not want to present the child's testimony in
public.
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and rules to provide for the use of closed circuit television or a
children's courtroom for eliciting testimony in child sexual abuse
prosecutions where the child witness is unavailable for live face to
face confrontation, but is available to give testimony in an alterna-
tive setting. The statutes or rules should provide for projection to
the jury of the demeanor of both child witness and defendant. The
rules and statutes should also provide for projection of the image
of the defendant before the child witness where the witness is will-
ing and able to testify under such circumstances, and where such
projection will not cause severe psychological injury.
States should modify their statutes and rules relating to per-
petuation depositions to provide for the taking and videotaping of
perpetuation depositions of child witnesses in sexual abuse prose-
cutions employing previously outlined procedures suggested for the
taking of testimony outside the physical presence of the defendant.
The prosecution should be allowed to take a perpetuation deposi-
tion on motion without requiring a showing of cause. Since the
deposition provides advantages to the accused even if the child
turns out to be available at trial, imposition of a specific showing
of likelihood of unavailability does not appear warranted. Of
course, the court must be assured that the child witness is truly
unavailable before it permits the deposition to be introduced.
It is generally preferable to use the videoptaped perpetuation
deposition, which incorporates closed circuit television to avoid live
face to face confrontation, instead of either live closed circuit testi-
mony at trial or the use of a children's courtroom. The videotaped
deposition is less likely to be perceived by the jury as an unusual
procedure. Moreover, when properly done, it may not be obvious to
the jury that the child and the accused were separated. The video-
taped deposition is thus less likely to be an intrusion on the pre-
sumption of innocence.
States should amend their statutes and rules to provide that
testimony of an unavailable child witness taken outside the physi-
cal presence of the accused, subject to cross-examination describ-
ing an act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by an-
other is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. The child's
testimony may be presented to the jury by either closed circuit tel-
evision, use of a children's courtroom, or a videotape of the child's
testimony given at a prior trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
perpetuation deposition. Admissibility should be conditioned upon
a showing that the child's testimony possesses particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness equivalent to those possessed by state-
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ments admitted pursuant to a traditional "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception. Only in unusual cases will the court be unable to find
equivalent particularized guarantees. It is, in fact, very likely that
oath, demeanor, whether live, via closed circuit television, or video-
taped, and cross-examination, if combined with projection of the
defendant's image before the child witness, alone create adequate
indicia of reliability to be admissible under Green and Roberts.
States should consider providing for admissibility solely on this ba-
sis. If the drafters of the statute or rule deem a showing of addi-
tional indicia of reliability necessary, the foregoing indicia may be
combined with the indicia of reliability presently associated with
Rule 803(24) and 804(b)(5)of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
To the extent that the procedures at the perpetuation deposi-
tion or other methods of presentation of the child's testimony are
modified to take into account differences asserted by some to be
important in examining children, the less likely oath, demeanor
and cross-examination alone will satisfy the equivalent particular-
ized guarantees of the trustworthiness requirement of Roberts. To
illustrate, if defense counsel in conducting cross-examination is not
permitted in the room with the child, but must ask questions by
giving them to a psychologist or other designated expert who first
converts the question into "children's talk" and then presents it to
the child, it is extremely likely that such equivalent particular cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness will not be found to ex-
ist. Cross-examination envisions cross-examination by counsel se-
lected by the accused confronting the witness. Alteration from this
expectation bears the risk of an enhanced probability of a finding
of inadmissibility. If such a modified procedure is deemed benefi-
cial, the statute or rule creating the appropriate hearsay exception
should definitely require a finding of equivalent guarantees of
trustworthiness based upon those factors now considered relevant
in deciding admissibility of a hearsay statement under Federal
Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5) and recently enacted state
hearsay exceptions for children's statements describing sexual
contact.
IV. CONCLUSION
The outcry of the public to disclosure of widespread child sex-
ual abuse can be addressed effectively within the established
boundaries of the confrontation clause. State legislatures can and
should enact new hearsay exceptions designed specifically to cope
with the question of the admissibility of out of court statements of
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child sexual abuse victims. New procedures for securing the testi-
mony of the child witness both at and prior to trial may and
should be created to respond to problems arising from the inability
to procure viva voce testimony from some child victims when
placed face to face with the accused in open court.
New hearsay exceptions and new procedures taking advantage
of video technology can and must comply with the confrontation
clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Mattox, Green, Ev-
ans and Roberts. Radical alterations, such as permitting introduc-
tion of ex parte videotaped statements of a child witness provided
the child is available to be called by the defendant, are neither
necessary nor constitutional. Evidentiary problems, thought by
some to be unique to child sexual abuse prosecutions, must not be
employed to weaken the constitutional protections granted the ac-
cused. Face to face physical confrontation between witness and ac-
cused is required if the mandate of the confrontation clause is to
be satisfied through the production of an available witness. If face
to face confrontation is truly not possible, such as when the poten-
tial of severe psychological injury makes the witness' viva voce tes-
timony relatively impossible, and the witness is thus properly con-
sidered unavailable, the confrontation clause provides for the
admissibility of the declarant's hearsay statements and testimony
if shown to possess adequate indicia of trustworthiness.
Strict construction of unavailability must be maintained. We
must not disregard the strong preference under the confrontation
clause for production of the complaining witness before the jury
under oath, subject to cross-examination, live face to face with the
defendant, testifying in a public courtroom, even in child sexual
abuse cases. The seriousness of the offense charged should make us
more, not less, inclined to secure the full constitutional protections
to the defendant.
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